Essays on Incentives and Information in Schools by Celik Katreniak, Dagmara
 
CERGE 
Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education 





























Michal Bauer (CERGE-EI, Co-Chair) 
Randall K. Filer (Hunter College, City University of New York, Co-Chair) 
Peter Katuscak (CERGE-EI) 
Daniel Munich (CERGE-EI) 




Karna Basu (Hunter College, City University of New York) 






Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................................... v 
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ix 
Abstrakt ......................................................................................................................................... xii 
Preface: Essential Background ..................................................................................................... 16 
The Education System in Uganda and the Experiment ................................................................ 17 
Ugandan Education System ...................................................................................................... 18 
Experimental Design ................................................................................................................. 22 
Timing and Logistics ................................................................................................................ 25 
Final Sample ............................................................................................................................. 27 
Stratification and Randomization ............................................................................................. 31 
1 Dark Side of Incentives in Schools: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment in 
Uganda .......................................................................................................................................... 33 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 33 
1.2 Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 36 
1.3 Baseline Summary Statistics .......................................................................................... 41 
1.4 The Effects of Incentives on Students’ Performance and Their Well-Being ................. 44 
1.4.1 Average Treatment Effects on Students’ Performance ........................................... 45 
1.4.2 Average Treatment Effects on Students’ Well-Being (Stress and Happiness) ....... 51 
1.4.3 Endogeneity between Performance and Stress ....................................................... 52 
1.4.4 Group Composition ................................................................................................. 55 
1.4.4.1 Ability Composition ............................................................................................ 56 
1.4.4.2 Gender Composition ........................................................................................... 58 
1.4.5 Distributional Analysis ........................................................................................... 60 
1.4.6 Positiveness and Negativeness of Feedback and Well-Being ................................. 61 
1.4.7 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation .......................................................................... 62 
1.4.8 Treatment Effects on Attrition ................................................................................ 63 
1.5 Gender Differences and the Channels of the Average Treatment Effects ..................... 65 
1.6 Robustness Checks ......................................................................................................... 68 
1.6.1 Multiple Comparisons ............................................................................................. 68 
1.6.2 Who are the Attrited Students? Random versus Non-Random Attrition ................ 69 
1.6.3 Stability of the Results ............................................................................................ 70 
1.7 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 73 
iv 
Appendix 1 .................................................................................................................................... 76 
2 Information Provision and Overconfidence: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial in 
Schools ........................................................................................................................................ 116 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 116 
2.2 Literature Review ......................................................................................................... 119 
2.2.1 The Dunning-Kruger Effect .................................................................................. 120 
2.2.2 How to Improve Self-Assessments? ..................................................................... 123 
2.3 Data and the Final Sample ........................................................................................... 125 
2.4 Results: Overconfidence and the Existence of the Unskilled-and-Unaware Phenomenon
 ………………………………………………………………………………………...127 
2.4.1 Overconfidence ..................................................................................................... 128 
2.4.2 The Unskilled-and-Unaware Phenomenon ........................................................... 132 
2.4.2.1 Bottom versus Top Performing Students and their Expectations ..................... 132 
2.4.2.2 Behavioral Bias or Statistical Artefact? ............................................................ 133 
2.5 Results: The Effects of Repeated Feedback Provision on Student Confidence ........... 135 
2.5.1 Average Treatment Effects of Incentives on Student Confidence ........................ 136 
2.5.2 Skilled and Unskilled Students and their Abilities to Realize their Competencies
 ……………………………………………………………………………………140 
2.6 Heterogeneity ............................................................................................................... 143 
2.6.1 Is the Effect Dependent on the Task Difficulty? .................................................. 143 
2.6.2 Gender Differences ............................................................................................... 145 
2.6.3 Student Confidence in Competition for Monetary and Non-Monetary Rewards . 146 
2.6.4 Differences by Age ............................................................................................... 148 
2.7 Summary ...................................................................................................................... 149 
Appendix 2 .................................................................................................................................. 151 
Bibliography 1 ............................................................................................................................ 167 





First and foremost, I would like to thank my main supervisors, Michal Bauer and 
Randy Filer. I was introduced to experimental economics in Michal’s lecture back in 2010, 
which changed my career fundamentally. His encouragement and guidance helped me to 
develop and implement a large-scale field experiment, which essentially combined my 
professional work with my personal interest. Randy patiently and systematically believed 
in me and provided me with guidance without which I would not have been able to put this 
project into place. I am also grateful to other members of my committee, namely, Nikolas 
Mittag, Daniel Munich, and Peter Katuscak, whose comments contributed to significant 
improvements in my dissertation. I would also like to thank Barbara Forbes and Deborah 
Novakova who helped me to turn this dissertation into a readable and understandable text. 
My gratitude also goes to my external referees, Gil S. Epstein and Karna Basu, for their 
helpful comments.  
I would also like to thank the wider community of CERGE-EI faculty members who 
interacted with me during my studies – Kresmir Zigic, Patrick Gaule, Stepan Jurajda, Eva 
Vourvachaki, Fabio Michelucci, Andreas Ortmann, Jan Zapal, Filip Matejka, Honza 
Hanousek, Alena Bicakova, Jakub Steiner and Byeongju Jeong – I am most grateful to them 
for their helpful input.  
I was lucky to have amazing classmates/colleagues around me. Special “thanks” 
goes to Eva Hromadkova, Jana Cahlikova and Pavla Vozarova for being there for me at any 
time. Thank you Andrea Majekova, and Branislav Zudel for motivating me to work hard 
during painful study-time and helping me to stay focused. Thank you Nata Shestakova, 
Klara Kaliskova, Vojtech Bartos, Lubomir Cingl, Tomas Lichard, Volha Audzei, Tomas 
Miklanek and Mirka Federicova for your critical comments that helped to shape my ideas.  
I would not have been able to implement my project without my local team in 
Uganda – thank you Winifred Candiru, Yaseen Nsubuga, Sandra Basemera, Semei Mukisa, 
Hanifa Zawedde for hours spent on boda-boda and for your patience with me in the field. 
Thank you, Juliana Bukirwa, for endless administrative support and making matatu drivers 
vi 
deliver missing exams to schools on time. Thank you, Ramjet Banura, Remmy Nambowa 
and Isma Nyombi for joining our team for follow-up testing. And thank you, Grace Mboizi, 
for not letting me get lost in Ugandan villages. 
Special thanks go to Misa Chatrna, Evicka Lakoma, Mirka Dolezalova, Pavli 
Danhelkova, Zuzka Kuranova, Baska Silharova, Klara Janotova and Zuzka Kazdova for 
unforgettable moments in Uganda. Girls, you made every day brighter - literally.  
This work would not have met its deadline without endless support of Kresimir 
Zigic, Lenka Pavlikova, Iva Havlickova, and Tereza Kulhankova as well as the members of 
the CERGE-EI Academic Skills Center. Thank you very much for your help, hard work and 
for being patient with me.  
Finally, I would like to thank my parents for their unlimited support and for being 
on my side when I decided to spend two years in Uganda (and for stopping their questions 
about the date of my dissertation defense).  
This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a 
program of the Global Development Network (GDN) and Grant Agency of Charles 
University (GAUK). All opinions expressed and all errors are mine. The project was 
implemented in close cooperation with Charitas Prague and Uganda Czech Development 
Trust. 
I dedicate this work to my husband, Levent Celik and our daughter Maya, who 



































The question posed in this dissertation is whether the quality of  education can be 
improved in a developing country by means of incentives for students to learn. This 
complex topic has been subject to a plethora of research studies in economics, psychology, 
and sociology using data from developed countries, but comparatively few studies have 
been conducted in the developing world. I discuss evidence from an extensive randomized 
control trial (RCT) employing a variety of incentive mechanisms, which I designed and 
implemented in primary and secondary schools in Southern Uganda. This study involved 
more than 5,000 students aged 11 through 25 who were repeatedly interviewed and tested 
between 2011 and 2013. I collected data and analyzed the effects of different incentive 
schemes on students’ performance on Math and English tests, and also on their well-being, 
measured by perceived happiness and stress.  The latter is a unique contribution to this 
field of study. 
The Preface provides contextual informaton on the Ugandan education system and the 
experimental design, critical to understanding the choices made at every level of this study. 
In Chapter 1, “The Dark Side of Incentives in Schools,” I discuss the effects of feedback, as 
well as monetary and non-monetary incentives on students’ performance and well-being. 
This study contributes by explicitly accounting for the tradeoffs between performance and 
well-being introduced by incentives. I implement two types of social comparative feedback 
regimes, within- and across-class group comparisons, and two types of incentive regimes, 
financial and reputation rewards. The results show that rewards can improve performance 
but at a cost of higher stress and lower happiness, whereas comparative feedback alone 
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(without rewards) increases performance only mildly but without a negative impact on 
student’s stress and happiness levels. Moreover,  the results show that more highly 
stressed students exert less effort, perform less well and are more often absent than those 
who are minimally stressed. Finally, the results also help to identify gender-specific 
responses to incentives: boys react strongly to rewards,  but girls do so only if they are also 
given feedback.  
In Chapter 2, “Information Provision and Overconfidence,” I investigate whether and 
how students calibrate self-assessment of their performance in response to feedback and 
contribute evidence to the debate regarding the existence of the unskilled-but-unaware 
phenomenon. 
While previous studies have found performance to be related to subjects’ confidence 
(Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), some subjects consistently overestimate their abilities (e.g., 
Ehrlinger et al., 2008). Although informing subjects about their performance has been 
shown to decrease their inflated beliefs (e.g., Ryvkin et al., 2012), they remain 
overconfident (e.g., Lipko et al., 2009). A possible explanation is that they lack information 
about others.  
As described in Chapter 2, students in the current RCT, who were from primary and 
secondary schools in Southern Uganda (as opposed to a typical sample involving 
(under)graduate students from developed countries), were evaluated and incentivized in 
groups repeatedly during an academic year. Students received complex feedback about 
their own performance and the performance of other group members. 
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The results show that the overconfidence of students in the control group (who 
received no feedback) increased with repeated testing, whereas feedback received by the 
treatment groups lowered students’ inaccurate estimates of their performance. Students 
reacted immediately after they received the first feedback, by improving their estimation 
about their own performance. Nevertheless, overconfidence remained. Although students 
improved continuously in every round, the most significant improvements were achieved 
after the first two feedback rounds. Girls updated significantly more compared to boys.  
Consistent with the “unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon”, the bottom-quartile 
performers grossly overestimated their performance, although, interestingly, so did top-
quartile performers, though to a significantly lesser degree. It is worth noting that the 
current experimental design makes it possible to document that the “unskilled-and-







Otázka, kterou se v mé disertaci zabývám spočívá v tom, jestli kvalita vzdělávání 
v rozvojové zemi může být zvýšena pomocí použití motivačních nástrojů navázaných na 
jejich výsledky ve školách. Toto obšírné téma bylo a je v hledáčku zájmu velkého množství 
studií v oblasti ekonomie, psychologie i sociologie založených na datech z rozvinutých 
zemí, zatímco relativně menší pozornost byla věnována rozvojovým krajinám. V disertaci 
přináším výsledky obsáhlého experimentu založeného na náhodné alokaci studentů 
základních a středních škol v Jižní Ugandě do skupin s nebo bez použití motivačních 
nástrojů (takzvaný „randomized control trial“). Celkem se studie zůčastnilo více než 5 tisíc 
studentů ve věku 11 až 25 let, kteří byli opakovaně testováni a tázáni v letech 2011 až 
2013. Dataset obsahuje údaje ohledně studijních výsledků z Matematiky a Angličtiny, 
zároveň subjektivní hodnocení vlastní spokojenosti měřeno pomocí vlastního vnímání 
radosti a stresu.   
V Předmluvě disertace poskytuji informace ohledně ugandského vzdělávacího 
systému a detailní popis designu experimentu s cílem ulehčit čitateli porozumění kontextu 
experimentu a jednotlivých rozhodnutí v jednotlivých krocích. V první kapitole nazvané 
“Temné Stránky Motivačních Nástrojů ve Školách” se zabývám efekty poskytování zpětné 
vazby, finančních a nefinančních odměn na studijné výsledky a spokojenost studentů. 
Hlavním přínosem této studie je explicitní srovnání efektů incentív na studijní výsledky a 
na spokojenost měřenou pomocí radosti a stresu. Celkem jsem zavedla dvě motivační 
schémy založené na zpětné vazbě (v rámci skupinek ve třídě nebo mezi třídami) a dvě 
založené na rozdávání odměn vítězům (finanční nebo reputační odměny). Výsledky ukazují, 
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že odměny sice motivují studenty zlepšit jejich studijní výsledky, jde to ale na úkor zvýšení 
stresu a snížení radosti, zatímco zpětná vazba má slabší vliv na zlepšení studijních 
výsledků, ale neovlivňuje spokojenost studentů. Zároveň výsledky poukazují na to, že 
studenti vykazující vyšší úroveň stresu vynakládají menší úsilí, vykazují horší výsledky a 
jsou častěji nepřítomní ve srovnání se studenty s minimální úrovní stresu. Výsledky 
zároveň pomáhají rozlišit odezvy na motivační faktory podle pohlaví: zatímco kluci reaguji 
pozitivně na odměny, holky reagují na zpětnou vazbu. Holky reagují na odměny pouze v 
případě, že dostávaly zpětnou vazbu.  
V druhé kapitole nazvané „Poskytování informací a přehnaná sebedůvěra“ zkoumám 
jestli a jakým způsobem studenti kalibrují sebehodnocení vlastních studijních výsledků 
v návaznosti na poskytnutí zpětné vazby. Výsledky této studie zároveň přispívají k diskusi 
ohledně existence takzvaného „unskilled-but-unaware“ fenoménu.  
Zatímco předešlé studie poukazují na propojenost studijních výsledků a sebedůvěry 
studentů (Camerer a Lovallo, 1999), někteří jedinci systematicky nadhodnocují vlastní 
schopnosti (např. Ehrlinger a spol., 2008). Podávání zpětné vazby subjektům ohledně jejich 
studijních výsledků se ukázalo jako účinné ve snaze snížit přehnaná očekávání (např. 
Ryvkin a spol., 2012). Nicméně sebedůvěra studentů zůstává nadhodnocená (např. Lipko a 
spol., 2009). Možným vysvětlením je právě to, že subjektům chybí detailní informace 
ohledně výsledků ostatních subjektů.  
Studenti tohoto experimentu, kteří navštěvovali základní a střední školy v jižní části 
Ugandy (na rozdíl od v literatuře převažujícího vzorku studentů vysokých škol 
z rovzinutých zemí), byli testovaní a odměňování ve skupinkách opakovaně po dobu 
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jednoho školního roku. Studenti v motivačním schématu se zpětnou vazbou získávali 
informace ohledně vlastních studijních výsledků a výsledků členů jejich skupiny. 
Výsledky poukazují na to, že studenti v kontrolní skupině (kteří nedostali v průběhu 
školního roku žádnou zpětnou vazbu) postupně zvyšovali svojí sebedůvěru s každým 
kolem testování, zatímco studenti, kteří dostávali opakovaně zpětnou vazbu snížili svá 
přehnaná očekávání ohledně vlastních výsledků. Studenti reagovali hned na podání první 
zpětné vazby tím, že snížili přehnaná očekávání. Nicméně zůstali přehnaně sebejistí.  
Studenti postupně zlepšovali přesnost hodnocení vlastních výsledků, nicméně hlavní 
zlepšení se dostavilo po obdržení první a druhé zpětné vazby. Dívky zlepšily 
sebehodnocení lépe než kluci.  
V souladu s  „unskilled-and-unaware” fenoménem, studenti ze spodního kvartilu 
statistické distribuce studijních výsledků vykazovali signifikantně vyšší sebedůvěru ve 
srovnání se studenty z horního kvartilu. Studenti z horního kvartilu nadhodnotili vlastní 
výsledky sice také ale v signifikantně nižší míře. Výsledky zároveň poukazují na to, že 









Preface: Essential Background 
Although substantial progress has been made in improving access to schooling in 
developing countries, higher enrollment needs to be accompanied by advances in education 
quality in order to achieve sustainable improvement (Hanushek, 2005). Among the approaches 
to improving quality, considerable attention has been paid recently to provision of controlled 
information and different types of incentives. Little attention has been paid, however, to the 
consequences of incentives on agents’ well-being, despite the fact that well-being is related to 
health, awareness, memory, and performance.  
Improvements in performance may be connected to students’ expectations regarding 
their performance. People – especially the unskilled at the bottom end of the performance 
distribution - are typically overconfident about their performance, i.e., they expect that they will 
score higher than they do in reality. Inaccurate predictions of one’s own ability may have 
economic consequences (e.g., enterpreneur failures as in Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). The 
design of this experiment allows me to compare the effects of various incentive schemes on 
calibration of student self-assesment. 
To the best of my knowledge, the current study is the first large scale experiment in a 
developing country studying the effects of feedback, incentives, and their interactions on student 
performance, well-being and confidence levels. The uniqueness of the experiment lies in its 
complexity as well as in the fact that more than 5,000 students in 52 schools in Southern 
Ugandan villages were tested and interviewed repeatedly during the 2012 academic year.  
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The dissertation is organized as follows. First, in the Preface: in Essential Background, I 
describe the education system in Uganda and explain the experimental design in detail.  In 
Chapter 1, “Dark Side of Incentives: A Randomized Field Eexperiment in Uganda,” I first provide 
a literature review using relevant studies from psychology and economics before discussing the 
effects of two types of feedback (within- and across-class feedback), two types of rewards 
(monetary and non-monetary rewards), and their combinations (each feedback type interacted 
with each reward type), on students’ performance and their well-being measured in terms of 
students’ perceived stress and happiness levels.  In Chapter 2, “Persistent Overconfidence: A 
Randomized Field Experiment in Uganda,” I analyze the depth of overconfidence present among 
students and whether their self-assessment is affected by repeated feedback. Moreover, 
I contribute to the debate regarding the existence of the unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon.  
The Education System in Uganda and the Experiment 
Access to schooling has substantially increased in developing countries since the 
“Education For All” movement was launched in 1990. Uganda was one of the first African 
countries to introduce Universal Primary Education (UPE) in January 1997, and the initiative 
was expanded to secondary schools in 2007 (Universal Secondary Education, USE). As 
a consequence of elimination of tuition fees, student access to primary education increased by 
27.7%, enrollment into secondary schools increased by 136% and the literacy rate improved to 
74.6% (UNESCO, 2015).  
The flip side of the success story is that many indicators show that improvements in 
quantity were not equaled by improvements in quality. In 2013 (according to World Bank 
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Development Indicators), only 56% of students completed primary school, giving Uganda the 
8th lowest completion rate in the world.  Only 29.4% of students completed lower secondary 
school in 2013 (the 7th lowest worldwide completion rate). More than 180,000 female and 
297,000 male children of official school age were not enrolled in primary or secondary school.  
The pupil-teacher ratio (the average number of pupils per teacher) in primary school class is 46 
– the 6th highest ratio of all 125 countries reported. The quality of Ugandan education remains 
poor.  
Ugandan Education System 
The academic year in Uganda starts in the 3rd or 4th week of January and finishes in late 
November/early of December. It consists of three trimesters separated by short holidays and a 
long holiday in December and January. Students in Uganda have free access to public primary 
and secondary schooling (due to UPE and USE). Public schools receive government funding 
based on the total number of students in each class. According to a 2015 UNESCO report, each 
primary school was supposed to receive 5,000 Ugandan Shillings (UGX) per year for each child in 
P1 – P3 and 8,100UGX for each child in P4 – P7. Government contributions to secondary schools 
was up to 141,000UGX per student. In both cases, parents still pay for uniforms, meals, and 
supplies. During the time the experiment was implemented, 1,000UGX was approximately 
0.80USD. It represented approximately 0.4% of the monthly salary of a public primary-school 
teacher. For this sum, a student could buy one bottle of soft drink, three to four exercise books, 
one quarter of grilled chicken, three chapattis (a local salty pancake) or one “rolex” (rolled-eggs 
in  chapatti), or approximately 0.25 liters of gasoline.  
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My data show that the average fee per term that public school students in the sample 
were asked to pay was 6,400UGX (excluding lunch) for P1–P3 students, 8,400UGX for P4-P6 
students and 14,400UGX for P7. Lunch fees ranged from 4,000 to 5,000UGX.  Most schools 
charged an admission fee which ranged from 1,000UGX to 5,000UGX1. While it is definitely not 
free education, this is significantly lower than the fees charged by private schools (the average 
fee per term was 29,400UGX for P1 – P3, 47,250UGX for P4 – P6 and 53,000UGX for P7). Lunch 
fees ranged from 10,000UGX to 35,000UGX. In both private and public schools, students in P7 
had an option to attend remedial classes for fees from 500UGX to 35,000UGX. Sometimes 
students were asked to make additional payments, such as (re)construction fees, development 
fees, and contributions to the teachers’ salary or rent. The tuition fees for secondary schools are 
approximately double the primary school fees.  
Students are admitted to primary schools at the age of 6 or 7 (or exceptionally at 5). Very 
often students attend pre-school education (nursery section) starting from the age of 3 (86.3% 
of students indicated that they attended nursery). The official language in primary and 
secondary schools is English; however, especially in lower primary schools, children are often 
taught in the local language2.  
Students are supposed to pass each grade to qualify to enter the next higher grade. Only 
slightly more than half of the students in my sample (51.2%) had not repeated at least one 
grade. Successful completion of the Primary Leaving Examination (PLE) is considered successful 
completion of primary education. Since not all schools have the rights to conduct PLE 
                                                 
 
1 I discussed the detailed scheme of fees during my personal meetings with headmasters and directors. Information 
was often publicly available.  
2 In Uganda there are 41 local languages. The common language in Mukono and Buikwe districts was Luganda. 
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examinations, students may register at a different primary school to sit the exam (sometimes 
students switch to a new school in the second or third term of P7). In 2011, students paid 
11,000UGX to attend a PLE examination administered in English and consisting of four 
mandatory subjects – Math, English, Science and Social studies. From each subject, students 
receive a score from 1 to 9 (1 being the best). The scores are summed up and each student is 
placed into a category/division (the higher the sum, the worse the aggregated score). The best 
grade is therefore 4 (1 from each subject). Students pass the exam if they are placed in Divisions 
1 to 4 (1 being the best3). Students who received higher scores are placed in Division U and 
recorded as failing. Absent students who paid the fee but did not participate fall into Division X. 
It is very important for each school to have at least one student in Division 1. Only students who 
passed PLE exams can be admitted to a secondary school and only students who scored below 
28 in aggregated scores can be admitted to the Universal Secondary Education program. 
Secondary schools have the right to set their own selection criteria when admitting new 
students to their first year (very often they set the minimum aggregate grade from the PLE 
examination in order to be admitted, which is higher than the PLE passing grade). Secondary 
education is divided into “O-level” (or lower secondary, from grades S1 to S4) and “A-level” (or 
higher secondary, grades S5 and S6). Only students who successfully pass the national 
examination in their S4 (Ugandan Certificate of Education, UCE) can continue to the higher A-
level. In 2011, students paid registration fees of 68,000UGX to participate in the UCE exam, 
which includes eight compulsory subjects – English, Math, Biology, Chemistry, Physics, 
Geography, History and Literature. Grading follows a similar structure as the PLE exam. The best 
                                                 
 
3 Students are placed in Division 1 if they scored between 4 and 12 aggregated points, in Division 2 if between 13 
and 23, in Division 3 if between 24 and 29, and Division 4 between 30 and 34. If a student received more than 34 
aggregated points, she is placed in Division U. Absent students are placed in Division X.  
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score in the UCE exam is therefore 8, while the worst is 72. After successful completion of the O-
level, students choose a specialization – art or science – and proceed to the A-level.  A-level 
studies are finalized by passing the Ugandan Advanced Certificate of Education (UACE), which 
consists of four taught subjects according to the specialization and a general paper. In 2011, the 
registration fee was 70,000UGX. Successful completion of secondary school is a necessary 
requirement to apply to university. Students can alternatively apply to a vocational school (even 
directly after primary school) or for alternative diplomas.  
Students in all levels can repeat national examinations if they pay the registration fee. 
During the national examinations an external committee – consisting of teachers selected by the 
Ugandan National Examination Board from all participating schools - visits the school, conducts 
the exam and collects examinations for external evaluations. Precautions are taken to minimize 
opportunities to cheat, teachers helping their students, and teachers influencing the evaluation 
of exams. The exam questions are equal for all schools and the results are therefore comparable 
across all schools in Uganda. 
The education system has many drawbacks. Students are not regularly informed about 
their performance. Only approximately 40% of students in my sample could describe their 
performance in their class. Headmasters often indicated that they lack resources to buy 
examinations for students. However, providing feedback to students may motivate them 
(especially girls) to improve their performance. Further, student absence rates are very high. 
The average absence rate of students interviewed and examined during the 2012 academic year 
was 29.2% (37.9% of students who were interviewed in 2011 changed schools or completely 
dropped out of school altogether). Reasons for absences and their lengths vary. Students were 
mostly absent for less than a term (77.4%), 17.7% missed 1 to 2 terms, 3.4% 1 to 2 years, and 
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1.5% more than 2 years. The main reasons for long-term absences were lack of money for school 
fees, help required by family members and sickness (their own or of family members). 
Experimental Design 
In this experiment, I study whether the provision of comparative feedback about their 
own performance and the performance of other group members can influence students’ 
performance and psychological well-being measured by self-reported stress and happiness 
levels. To evaluate the effect of the intervention, I designed a Randomized Control Trial (RCT) 
experiment. Two types of feedback were offered – within-class and across-class feedback. 
Students randomized into the within-class feedback group were randomly divided into groups of 
three to four classmates within each class and evaluated as groups within the class. Group 
averages constituted the basis for performance comparisons. The students in the across-class 
feedback group were evaluated as a whole class (using the class average) and compared to other 
classes of the same grade in different schools. Comparisons were based on the average of the 
Math and English scores in the group.  
Feedback differed in content across the treatment groups. Each student in the within-
class feedback group received information about his Math and English scores, his/her group-
mates’ scores, the group average and the ranking of his/her group within his class. Furthermore, 
starting in testing round 3, each student received information about his/her (and his/her group-
mates’) improvement or decline from the two preceding testing rounds. Students in the across-
class feedback group received information about how they scored in Math and English 
personally (they were not given information about their classmates), the class average and the 
23 
ranking of their class compared to other classes. The positions in both treatments were 
presented on a rank-order graph (see Appendix B1.4 and B1.5). Students in the control group 
received no information; they only took exams. Students were tested repeatedly during the 2012 
academic year and received informational feedback three to four times depending on the 
feedback group (across-class/within-class feedback, respectively). Note that students in the 
across-class group (T2) first received feedback in testing round 3 (one-round delay compared to 
the within-class group students) due to logistical reasons. As shown in section 1.4, the effects of 
within- and across-class feedback are comparable.  
Students were not offered rewards until testing round 4 was finished. In order to study 
the effects of monetary and non-monetary rewards, I orthogonally re-randomized the sample at 
school level4 before the final school visit (three to four weeks in advance5) and introduced 
financial and reputational rewards (see also Figure 1). The randomization divided the sample  
into 9 groups – one control group, four sole treatment groups (i.e., one type of treatment only) 
and four combined treatment groups (two types of feedback interacted with two types of 
rewards). The scheme with all treatments offered is shown in Figure 3. Students were informed 
about the exact rules of the competition during our personal visit and also via posters we left in 
each class. Note that I can only study short-term effects of rewards since they were offered only 
once at the end of the academic year.  
The aim of this cross-cutting design was to observe whether rewards could enhance 
student performance, especially if combined with within- and across-class feedback treatments 
                                                 
 
4 The randomization was done at the school level in order to avoid spillover effects and possible confusion.  
5 Therefore, compared to other studies, students in this experiment had some time to adjust to the treatment (e.g., to 
prepare for the test). 
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(see also Figure 2) and whether student well-being would be affected. Students in the financial 
treatment groups could win 2,000UGX per person (which is approximately 0.80USD according to 
that day’s exchange rate6). Students in the reputational reward scheme were promised that if 
they qualified for the reward, their names would be announced in the most popular local 
newspaper in the region, Bukedde. The qualification criteria differed based on original 
randomization into treatments (see Table 1) but the general rule was to reward the 15% best 
performing students/groups/classes, and the 15% most improved students/groups/classes7. In 
order to avoid confusion, students were given exact information regarding the number of   
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6 For 2,000UGX, a student could buy, for example, two bottles of soft drink, a decent lunch in a canteen, three to four 
pens, two to three avocados, etc.   
7 In other words, if students were part of a within-class feedback group and competed for rewards, they would win 
the reward if their group scored in the top 15% of all groups or if they ranked among the top 15% of the most 
improved groups between testing rounds 4 and 5. If students were part of the across-class feedback group, the 
whole class would win the reward if the class was among the 15% top performing or 15% most improved classes. 
Finally, if students received no feedback, they would win the reward if they ranked among the 15% best performing 
or 15% most improved students in their class.  
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winning groups (if in a within-class feedback group), the number of winning classes (if in an 
across-class feedback group), or the number of winning students (if originally in a control 
group). I used percentages in order to guarantee a comparable number of winners across all 
treatment groups. 
Figure 1: Orthogonal randomization of the sample into reward treatments 
 
 
Timing and Logistics 
The experiment was conducted between August 2011 and August 2013. The baseline 
survey was conducted between September and December 2011. In total, 8158 students 
answered questionnaires containing basic demographic questions, questions regarding family 
background and family composition, parental status, education and job, family wealth and 
additional questions regarding the students’ interests, opinions, self-esteem and aspirations.  
The intervention and the core data collection took place from January 2012 to December 
2012. Students were tested twice per term, i.e., approximately every one and half months. In 
total, five testing rounds were conducted. Testing dates and times were arranged in advance by 
phone with the headmaster or the director of the school, and confirmed one day before testing. 
In general, three to four schools were visited every day, 5 times per week. 
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The agenda of each visit was similar. After we entered the class, students in feedback-
treatment groups received their feedback while control students immediately started answering 
the questionnaires and exam questions. The order was as follows: “Before Math questionnaire”, 
followed by a 30-minute Math examination, then “After Math Before English questionnaire”, the 
English exam in the subsequent 20 minutes, and finally the “After English questionnaire”. The 
core questions of these short questionnaires were related to students’ expectations regarding 
how many points they thought they would earn on the Math and English examinations, how 
much effort they planned to put/they had put into answering the questions and the level of their 
current happiness. All questions were asked before and after each exam. No before-Math or 
before-English questionnaires were collected during the baseline survey since students saw the 
examinations for the first time. 
During the academic year, students in the feedback groups received feedback in the form 
of a report card, which was glued into a small progress report book that each child in the 
treatment group received. My team members explained the content of the report card 
repeatedly to minimize the risk that students would not understand feedback content (also, the 
score cards were designed by students during our interviews in 2011). The books were stored at 
the schools, and headmasters promised to allow children to check their books at any point. The 
books contained necessary information to keep a child’s attention and motivation levels active. 
After the experiment, students were allowed to  keep their books.  
Students were tested in Math and English. In order to ensure transparency, I used self-
constructed tests based on questions students must answer on the Primary and Secondary 
Leaving examinations, which are developed and published by the Ugandan National Examination 
Board (available in bookstores). The selection of questions was tested in pilot sessions in schools 
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in Wakiso District which were not part of the final sample in the 2012 testing (for further details, 
see the next section). The level of difficulty was adjusted to grade curriculums and student 
proficiency. All tests were evaluated by myself and my team. 
 





   
   
 








   













































































































The project was designed in close cooperation with the Uganda Czech Development Trust 
(UCDT), an affiliation of the non-governmental organization Archdiocese Caritas Prague, Czech 
Republic, which has been running a sponsorship program “Adopce na dalku” in Uganda since 
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1993. According to UCDT representatives, students were enrolled in primary and secondary 
schools based on their own choices, therefore supported students should not differ from non-
supported students in terms of their school choice. In 2011, UCDT sponsored students studying 
at 46 primary and 30 secondary schools located in 5 districts in Central Uganda – Mpigi (4 
schools), Wakiso (9 schools), Mukono (14 schools), Buikwe (45 schools) and Buvuma (4 
schools). Mpigi and Buvuma districts were excluded from my experiment from the beginning 
because in each district there were only 4 primary schools and no secondary schools8.  
During the baseline survey,  my team and I visited 60 schools, including 34 primary and 
26 secondary schools in Wakiso, Mukono and Buikwe districts. The baseline survey, however, 
showed that Wakiso district is different from Mukono and Buikwe in terms of the demographic 
characteristics of its students, as it encircles the capital city, Kampala. Time and budget 
constraints were other reasons to exclude Wakiso from the sample. 
The final sample consisted of 52 schools (31 primary and 21 secondary) of which 19 are 
public, 23 are private and 10 are community schools (community schools are similar to private 
schools but are founded by a community as opposed to by an individual entity). All schools were 
located in rural areas. Initially there were 53 schools in my sample; one decided not to 
participate after I conducted the baseline survey. This school was initially randomized into the 
control group and its exclusion did not lead to significant differences in terms of the baseline 
observables. The headmasters of the remaining 52 schools agreed to participate in the 
experiment. The headmasters had an option to withdraw from participation at any time during 
the experiment, nonetheless no school opted to do so. I asked the headmasters to communicate 
                                                 
 
8 It is also worthwhile to note that Mpigi is the only district located South-west of Kampala and Buvuma is an island 
district. 
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the content of the project to parents during regular parental meetings. In addition to the 
headmasters’ consent, I also had the full support of UCDT (the letter of accordance appears in 
Appendix B1.39). In order to minimize possible costs from our presence at schools, the duration 
of meetings was set to a maximum of 120 minutes. All meetings were organized with the 
headmasters one week in advance to find the most suitable and least harmful time in terms of 
the curriculum delivered. Administering exams in Math and English was supposed to serve 
students as additional training for the leaving examinations they face during the final years of 
their studies in primary (grade 7) and lower secondary (grade 4) schools.  
In total, 146 classes10 (P6 and P7 in primary schools, S1 up to S4 in secondary schools) 
ammounting to more than 5,000 students were repeatedly tested. Based on the power 
calculations using Optimal Design software (Raudenbush, S. W., et al., 2011) such a number of 
classes is sufficient to detected effect size of 0.15 standard deviations. Treatment effects that are 
lower than 0.15 standard deviations may or may not be detected, depending on the standard 
errors. The calculation accounts for stratification and clustering at the higher level. A figure 
plotting effect size with respect to the total number of clusters can be found in Appendix A1.4.  
In addition to Math and English scores, I collected information about students’ reported 
immediate effort, their strategic effort in preparation for the exams and their happiness level, 
measured immediately before and after each exam. I also repeatedly inquired about student 
expectations of their own scores from the Math and English tests in order to measure their 
confidence. To study students’ well-being, I collected data on their happiness based on the 
                                                 
 
9 There is no Institutional Review Board (IRB) for social sciences in the Czech Republic which could issue an IRB 
approval for my experiment. The experiment was designed in line with the conventions of IRB standards.  
10 If a school had more than one class of P6 – P7 or S1 – S4, all classes were included in the testing. Students in P1 – 
P5 were not included because they repeatedly failed to understand the instructions in the pilot testing. 
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Subjective Happiness Scale (Lyubomirsky and Lepper, 1997) and subjective stress based on the 
Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen et al., 1983). The happiness score is calculated as a sum across 
four questions using a 7-point Likert scale (with 1 being maximum and 7 minimum). Similarly, 
stress scores are based on the answers from four questions from a 5-point Likert scale in which 
1 equals no stress and 5 is maximum stress. The questionnaires can be found in Appendices B1.1 
and B1.2. In addition to student-level data, I also collected information regarding school (school 
type, school area, school fee structure and school equipment), headmasters and teachers 
(demographic information, years of experience, salary and their opinions on education). 
Due to large attrition between 2011 and 2012 and the admission of new students 
throughout the 2012 academic year, detailed information collected in 2011 is available for only 
about 52% of students who participated in the 2012 experiment. In every testing round during 
the academic year 2012 it happened that some students got sick during the testing (mainly 
malaria) or stole the examinations, which resulted in an unequal number of Math and English 
exams available. The total number of such cases is between 0.1 and 0.3%. Excluding these 
students does not change the results. Some students failed to correctly answer questions in the 
questionnaires and either marked more than one option (if only one was possible) or forgot to 
answer all questions. This results in an unequal number of observations, e.g., in the effort 
exerted into Math or English exam, subjective happiness or the expected number of points. The 
total number of such cases does not exceed 1%. The crucial difference in the number of 
observations is between the number of students who completed baseline Math and English 
exams and those who completed baseline happiness and stress questionnaires. Due to logistical 
issues, happiness and stress questionnaires were collected at the very beginning of the second 
testing round before any feebdack had been distributed. Therefore, 19% students who were 
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present in testing round 1 were not present in round 2.  In order to see to what extent the 
treatment effects differ, I compared the estimations of the treatment effects from regressions 
conditioned on students’ presence in testing round 2 to regressions conditioned on their 
absence11. The results are similar in size with lower standard errors. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test resulted in students present in the first two testing rounds and those present in the first but 
not the second testing round coming from the same distribution.  
 
Stratification and Randomization 
In order to increase the balance between control and treatment groups, the sample was 
stratified along three dimensions – school location (the sample was divided into four areas 
differing by level of remoteness), average school performance in national testing (above average 
or below average) and student level (grade 6 and 7 of primary education and grades 1 to 4 of 
secondary education). Within each strata, I randomized the sample into treatment and control 
groups. The randomization was done in two stages (as shown in Figure 3). First, after the 
stratification of the sample by school performance and area, I randomized the whole sample of 
53 schools into treatment and control groups in a 2:1 ratio. The randomization was performed at 
the school level and resulted in 36 treatment and 17 control schools. School-level randomization 
in the first stage was chosen in order to minimize control group contamination due to 
information spillovers. In the second stage, I divided classes of the treatment schools randomly 
into within- class feedback (T1) and across-class feedback groups (T2) in a 1:1 ratio (class-level 
randomization). In this scenario, no student in a control-group school received any treatments,  
                                                 
 
11 Note that the dependent variable in the regression is endline performance of students and I control for the baseline 
performance.  
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and students in the treatment-group schools received either within- or across-class feedback 
depending on the type of intervention their class was randomized into. Overall, 1/3 of the 
sample is the control group, 1/3 is treatment group 1 (T1) and 1/3 is treatment group 2 (T2). 
Exposure to the treatment is the only difference in the outcomes between the control and 
treatment groups. 
Figure 2: Map with coordinates of schools participating in the study 
 
 




1 Dark Side of Incentives in Schools: Evidence from 
a Randomized Field Experiment in Uganda 
1.1 Introduction 
A trophy for the best student in a class, a certificate for the most improved learner, or a 
bonus payment for the employee of the month; we are routinely faced with incentives of 
different types (symbolic, reputation, or financial rewards) throughout our lives. Rewards are 
often believed to motivate subjects and subsequently improve their performance, and are 
therefore implemented in many different environments (Lazear, 2000; Fryer, 2010; etc). We are 
also routinely compared to classmates, colleagues, or other competitors by receiving relative 
feedback about our performance, which can also improve performance. Feedback may motivate 
subjects to improve their performance (Andrabi et al., 2014; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010) though 
the evidence of such positive effects is more scattered.12 Feedback and incentives may also 
influence our well-being (Azmat and Iriberri, 2016) and changes in well-being may further 
influence people’s decision-making and economic outcomes (e.g., Juster et al., 2010; for more 
details see section 1.2 Literature Review).  
The current work is a unique study implemented in the field that analyzes the effects of 
various types of motivation schemes on performance and well-being, measured by perceived 
stress and happiness of students evaluated in groups. Its main contribution comes from 
explicitly accounting for the performance-versus-well-being tradeoff introduced by incentives. 
                                                 
 
12 According to psychologists, positive feedback is believed to increase intrinsic motivation and foster long-term 
motivation, whereas negative feedback decreases intrinsic motivation (Burgers et al., 2015; Arnold, 1976; Deci, 
1972). A short description of the extrinsic and intrinsic motivation can be found in section 1.4.7. 
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The novelty of the experiment comes from the wide scope of outcome measures observed, its 
rich experimental design and its unique data set. The sample size consists of more than 5000 
primary and secondary school students from 146 classes in Southern Uganda who were 
repeatedly tested and interviewed over a full academic year in 2012. In total, five testing rounds 
were administered. The design offers a direct comparison of the effects of two feedback types 
and two reward types as well as their combinations (each feedback type interacted with each 
reward type).  
Feedback differed across feedback-treatment groups with respect to its content.  Each 
student in the within-class feedback group (class randomly divided into groups of three to four 
students) received information about how he/she scored in Math and in English, how his group-
mates scored and the position of the group within his/her class. Students in the across-class 
comparative feedback group (comparisons of entire classes) received information about how 
they scored in Math and in English personally but were not given information about their 
classmates and the position of their class compared to other classes.  
Students were not offered rewards until testing round 4 was finished. They were then 
orthogonally randomized into financial, reputation and no-reward groups. Students in the 
financial reward group could win 2,000UGX per person (approximately 0.80USD according to 
that day’s exchange rate). Students in the reputational reward group were promised that if they 
qualified for the reward, their names would be announced in Bukedde, the most popular 
regional newspaper, and they would receive a certificate. The general criterion used was to 
reward 15% of the top performing and 15% of the most improving students/groups/classes.  
The results show that students improved their performance in response to feedback or 
reward provision. The improvements are mild in terms of size (0.08 to 0.13 SD) but comparable 
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to existing literature. The improvements are, however, significantly higher when students 
received a combination of feedback and rewards (up to 0.28 SD). While feedback and 
reputational rewards motivated students to improve only in Math (no improvement in English), 
financial rewards led to comparable improvements in both subjects.  
The results for outcomes other than learning, i.e., happiness and stress, counterweight 
the benefits of providing rewards. Students who were offered only rewards (without any 
feedback) reported elevated stress levels and decreased happiness, whereas the well-being of 
students who received only feedback remained unchanged. Moreover, most of the treatment 
combinations led to a decrease in students’ stress and an increase in or no effect on happiness. 
Thus, we can speak of an important trade-off: the introduction of rewards increases 
performance more than feedback alone, but at the same time they lowered students’ well-being. 
The effects persist when I control for multiple comparison testing by adjusting the p-values 
using the Simes step-up method (Simes, 1986).  
In some experiments, boys and girls responded very differently to certain incentives. The 
second major contribution of this paper is to shed light on the underlying reasons for these 
gender differences. I find that if girls were given rewards but no group feedback, they 
significantly underperformed boys. If girls were repeatedly informed about their performance 
and performance of their groups, however, no matter what type of feedback they received, their 
performance improved and became comparable to that of boys. In other words, comparative 
feedback in a tournament environment played a crucial role in motivating girls to improve their 
performance. Boys, by contrast, reacted only to rewards.  
The current design of the experiment does not allow me to distinguish whether gender 
differences were caused by the fact that students were evaluated in groups (group identity 
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effect) or were repeatedly informed about their standing. Nevertheless, since both within- and 
across-class feedback groups delivered similar effects, it seems more likely that the effect is 
driven by social comparison rather than by group identity. Such a result would be in line with 
“reference group neglect”, i.e., students neglect information about others and focus solely on 
feedback regarding their own performance (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999). 
1.2 Literature Review 
According to social comparison theory13, informing a child about his/her performance 
without comparing it to other children causes inappropriate evaluations of the child’s ability and 
can influence effort negatively (Festinger, 1954;14 founder of the social comparison theory). On 
the other hand, comparison enables a child to find his/her relative position within a particular 
group, which, via enhanced competitiveness, can lead to an increase in effort and subsequent 
improved performance.  
Feedback provision, as a way to inform subjects about their absolute or relative standing, 
has been analyzed in different environments and has delivered opposing results. Andrabi et al., 
(2014), for example, provided parents, teachers and headmasters with report cards informing 
them how children were doing in a particular school. The intervention resulted in 0.1 SD 
improvement in student test scores. Azmat and Iriberri (2010) informed high school students 
about their relative standing, resulting in a 5% improvement in grades. Additionally, university 
                                                 
 
13 Social comparison theory is about “our quest to know ourselves, about the search for self-relevant information 
and how people gain self-knowledge and discover reality about themselves” (Mettee and Smith 1977, p. 69–70). 
14 Festinger in his original paper focused on the social comparison of abilities and opinions only. Since then, 
however, many different dimensions of social comparison have been studied (e.g., Buunk and Gibbons, 1997 and 
2000; Suls and Wheeler, 2000). See for example Locke and Latham (1990); Suls and Wheeler (2000), for an 
overview of papers in psychology and management science. See Buunk and Gibbons (2007) for an overview of work 
in social comparison and the expansions of research on social comparison.  
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students in the United Kingdom responded positively and improved their performance by 13% 
in response to feedback regarding their own absolute performance (Bandiera et al., 2015).15 On 
the other hand, not all studies find positive responses to feedback provision. Azmat et al., (2015) 
do not find any effect of relative feedback on performance among students at University Carlos 
III in Madrid, Spain. In the short period after feedback was provided they find a slight downturn 
in student performance. More evidence of negative effects of incentives on performance can be 
found in experiments implemented in the workplaces. Workers in a crowd-sourcing experiment 
(using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowd-sourcing webpage) lowered their performance after 
they received information about their rank position (Barankay, 2011). Health workers also 
decreased their performance during a training program in Zambia when exposed to social 
comparison (Ashraf et al., 2014).16 
The effect of feedback depends on to whom the subjects are compared, how they are 
compared and whether they are rewarded for their performance. Students face social 
comparison in their classrooms on a daily basis, and it can strongly influence their self-esteem 
and their performance (Dijskstra et al., 2008) as well as their well-being (Azmat and Iriberri, 
2016). It is therefore important to understand with whom to optimally compare students. If 
students are compared to those who are slightly better, their effort and performance tend to 
                                                 
 
15  Tran and Zeckhauser (2012), Blanes-i-Vidal and Nossol (2010) and Fryer (2010) are examples of other studies 
with positive effects of feedback provision. 
16 There are also controlled lab environments studying the effects of feedback provision, e.g., Falk and Ichino (2006) 
and Mas and Moretti (2009) which have found that if one lets people observe the behavior of their peers, their 
performance improves. Kuhnen and Tymula (2012) and Duffy and Kornienko (2010) find a positive effect to the 
provision of private feedback. Eriksson et al. (2009), on the contrary, find that rank feedback does not improve 
performance (even if pay schemes were used). Hannan et al. (2008) find a negative effect of feedback on relative 
performance under a tournament incentive scheme (if feedback is sufficiently precise). 
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increase17. Students can be compared individually or in groups where a group’s outcome 
depends on each member’s contribution, which may foster mutual help (Slavin, 1984), in 
addition to positive peer effects (Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001). Groups can be formed 
endogenously, e.g., by students themselves based on friendship, or exogenously (Blimpo, 2014).  
In some studies, the effects of interventions are more pronounced if students are involved in 
tournaments (Eriksson et al., 2009; Bigoni et al., 2010; VanDijk et al., 2001).18  
Subjects often improve their performance if they are rewarded financially. Bettinger 
(2012), Angrist et al. (2002, 2006, 2009, 2010), Kremer (2004), Bandiera (2010), and others 
studied the effects of providing cash payments, vouchers or merit scholarships to students who 
successfully completed a pre-defined task. In such experiments, knowing their relative position 
is not crucial since success does not depend on the performance of others.  
In order to induce stronger competitive pressure, subjects need to be put into a 
tournament with a limited number of winners. VanDijk et al. (2001), based on an experiment 
comparing different payment schemes, conclude that it is better for a firm to introduce a 
tournament-based scheme over a piece-rate or group payment scheme. In the case of Blimpo 
(2014), groups involved in a tournament improved by approximately the same amount as 
groups rewarded for reaching a performance target. All treatments (with or without 
competition) resulted in positive improvement in student performance, which increased 
between 0.27 to 0.34 SD. Not only positive treatment effects have been found. Fryer (2010) and 
Eisenkopf (2011) studied the impact of different financial rewards on student performance and 
                                                 
 
17 Ray (2002), using a theoretical model, shows that performance and effort decrease if the comparison target is too 
far from a student’s ability.  
18 See Hattie and Timperley (2007) for a review of the literature on the provision of feedback. 
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did not find any significant improvements (although Fryer (2010) claims that the effect might 
not have been detected because of lack of statistical power).  
Even when financial rewards result in performance improvements, they may not 
necessarily be cost-effective (e.g., Bandiera et al., 2015)19. Alternative rewards20 that could 
possibly be more cost-effective have drawn researchers’ attention.  For example, Kosfeld and 
Neckerman (2011) designed a field experiment where students in the treatment group were 
offered symbolic rewards (a congratulatory card) for the best performance while students in the 
control group were offered nothing. Their results provide strong evidence that status and social 
recognition rewards have motivational power and lead to an increase in work performance (by 
12% on average). Subjects in a real-effort experiment conducted by Charness et al. (2010) 
increased their effort in response to the relative performance and expressed their “taste for 
status”. Jalava et al. (2015) offered sixth grade students in primary schools different types of 
non-monetary rewards (criterion-based grading, a certificate or a prize in the form of a pen if 
they scored among the top 3 students). The effects were heterogeneous with respect to original 
ability (students from the two middle quartiles responded the most to the incentives) and with 
respect to gender (boys improved their performance in response to rank-based incentives only, 
girls also improved when given symbolic rewards). Rank-based grading and symbolic rewards, 
however, crowded out intrinsic motivations of students.  
If non-monetary rewards have the power to motivate subjects to improve their 
performance, then naturally, questions arise: what can we learn from direct comparison of 
                                                 
 
19 Bandiera et al. (2012) find the financial rewards cost-ineffective since only a fraction of the students from the 
second quartile of initial ability distribution react positively to financial rewards. 
20 See also theoretical models studying the effects of reputation and symbolic rewards on subjects’ performance in 
Weiss and Fershtman (1998), Ellingsen and Johannesson (2007), Besley and Ghatak (2008), Moldovanu et al. 
(2007) and Auriol et al. (2008). 
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monetary and non-monetary rewards? Would financial rewards prevail? Levitt et al. (2012) 
present the results of a set of field experiments in primary and secondary schools, in which they 
provided students with financial and non-financial rewards, with and without delay and with 
incentives framed as gains and losses. In terms of performance change the experiment showed 
that for younger students both monetary and non-monetary rewards brought similar results and 
therefore non-monetary rewards were more cost-effective21.  
Feedback and incentives may also influence psychological well-being (Azmat and Iriberri, 
2016). Change in well-being has been found to influence people’s decision making and economic 
outcomes. An increase in happiness22 is associated with better health, sharper awareness, and 
higher activity in addition to better social functioning (Veenhoven, 1998). Education is one 
determinant of happiness with higher education associated with greater well-being (Helliwell et 
al., 2012; Dolan et al., 2008).  
Subjects under stress make suboptimal decisions, which, in the case of students, could 
lead to incorrect answers during examinations, or suboptimal choices in their activities (e.g., to 
be absent from school, to drop out of school or to exert low levels of effort). Both stress and 
happiness influence subjects’ health (Juster et al., 2010; McEwen, 2008; Schneiderman et al., 
2005). Stress can influence learning and memory creating learning problems (Lubin et al., 2007; 
Wolf, 2009). In the extreme, stress hormones may even influence brain structure (Lupien et al., 
2009).  
                                                 
 
21 They also found that rewards provided with delay lose their motivational power, and that it depends whether the 
rewards are framed as gains or losses (the second alternative being more robust).  
22  See Fordyce (1988) for a review of happiness measures and MacKerron (2012) for a review of the economics of 
happiness; Dolan et al. (2008) review well-being.  
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The current experiment differs from existing studies in the complexity of incentive 
schemes implemented and its broader scope of outcomes. In adition to performance commonly 
used as a dependent variable, I study students’ confidence, stress, happiness and their academic 
aspirations. The results of the existing literature suggest a possible trade-off between 
performance and change in well-being. Evaluation of students in groups should enhance 
cooperation within groups and lead to group average improvements. If the group is big enough, 
however, free-riding behavior may prevail and result in heterogeneity within the group 
outcomes. Informing students about the position of their group could either lead to 
improvements in performances via enhanced competition or demotivate students with a 
negative attitude toward competition. Alternatively, students could neglect information about 
their group members and focus solely on their own performance (Camerer and Lovallo, 2002). 
The effect potentially depends on group gender and/or ability composition (Apesteguia et al., 
2012) and group position in the group ability distribution. Students included in both financial 
and reputational reward treatments are expected to improve their scores, at least those in the 
second quartile of ability distribution. Students involved in a competition may experience 
increased stress levels and it is a question whether “short term pain“ can bring “long term gain“ 
and what the consequences of decreased well-being may be.                            
 
1.3 Baseline Summary Statistics 
 
Data on student performance, demographics and student responses to questions suggests 
that randomization divides the sample into groups that are similar in expectations (see Tables 
1.1 and 1.2 below, and Appendices A1.1 to A1.3 for the treatment-control group comparisons).  
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Table 1.1: Randomization balance: by feedback treatment status 
 
 














(T1 – C) 
 
 


















































Average class size  
 
Expected number of points  
     from Math  
Expected number of points  
     from English  
Perceived difficulty of  
     Math exam 
Perceived difficulty of  
     English exam  
Immediate happiness after     
     Math exam 
Immediate happiness after  
     English exam  
Effort put into Math exam 
 
Effort put into English exam 
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Education over relax 
 





































































































































































































Note: comparison of mean characteristics of students in treatment and control groups. T1 (T2) stands for within-(across-) class 
social comparison groups and C for control group. Robust standard errors clustered at class level are in parentheses, adjusted for 
stratification.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 1.2: Randomization balance: by reward treatment status   
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Expected number of points  
     from Math  
Expected number of points  
     from English  
Perceived difficulty of  
     Math exam 
Perceived difficulty of 
     English exam  
Immediate happiness after  
     Math exam 
Immediate happiness after  
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Effort put into Math exam 
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Note: comparison of mean characteristics of students in treatment and control groups. Fin(Rep) stands for financially 
(reputationally) rewarded groups, and No represents the control group with no rewards. Robust standard errors clustered at 
class level are in parentheses; adjusted for stratification. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%.  
44 
Few significant differences can be observed between the across-class feedback and 
control groups, although students in the across-class feedback group were slightly more 
stressed, slightly less happy and exerted slightly more effort compared to the control group. If 
the covariates are correlated with student performance, such an imbalance could bias the 
estimation of the treatment effect of the intervention (Firpo et al., 2014). One can expect some 
imbalances between treatment and control groups to occur purely by chance - as the number of 
balance tests rises, the probability of rejection of the null hypothesis of no difference between 
treatment and control group also increases.  In my case, treatment and control groups differ 
significantly in less than 5% of all cases. 
The average student scored 8.06 points out of 50 in the Math exam and 14.07 points out 
of 50 in English. In most of the cases, the real scores are below students’ expectations. A 
student’s miscalibration of his/her own performance is approximately 100%. The average 
student put “a lot of effort” into answering the exam questions (intensity level 4 in the 5-point 
Likert scale) and seems to be “very happy” according to the immediate happiness scale 
(intensity level 2 in the 7-point Likert scale where 1 is the maximum). The average student finds 
the Math exam of comparable difficulty to the regular exams at school and the English exam 
easier. Overall the average student is quite happy (based on the Perceived Happiness Scale) and 
has a low level of stress (Perceived Stress Scale). 
1.4 The Effects of Incentives on Students’ Performance and Their Well-
Being 
The core question of the experiment is how different incentive schemes (social 
comparison, financial and non-financial rewards) influence student performance and well-being. 
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I first analyze the aggregated treatment effects (i.e., the overall treatment effect of the within- or 
across-class feedback in each testing round and the effects of financial and reputational rewards 
in the final testing round (see Appendix C1.1 for details regarding calculation of the treatment 
effect). Later, I disentangle the sole treatment effects (only feedback and only rewards) and the 
interaction effects (each type of feedback interacted with each type of reward). I discuss the role 
of group gender and ability composition and I study whether the type of feedback students 
receive matters for improvement. Finally, I look at the distributional analysis.  
1.4.1 Average Treatment Effects on Students’ Performance  
Repeated provision of feedback (pooled or separately by feedback type) increased 
students’ overall performance by 0.07 SD, which is typically considered a small effect in the 
education literature. In other words, the average student who received within-class or across-
class feedback scored higher than 52.8% of students in the control group. The type of feedback 
does not play a significant role. The results are similar once I separate sole effects of feedback 
provisions from those interacted with rewards (as shown in equation 3 in Appendix C1.1). Table 
1.3 summarizes the aggregated average treatment effects of feedback and rewards on students’ 
overall performance in columns 1 and 4, and on their subjective well-being, i.e., happiness and 
stress in columns 5 and 6. For aggregated average treatment effects on Math and English 
separately see Appendix C1.2.  The effects are expressed in SD.  
The results are very similar to the results of Jalava et al. (2015), who tested the effects of 
different grading schemes on primary school students in Sweden and found 0.077 SD for 
criterion-based grading, and 0.080 SD for tournament grading. Similarly, in a study in Pakistan, 
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parents and teachers received report cards regarding the performance of their 
children/students, which led to a 0.1 SD increase in student performance (Andrabi et al., 2014). 
In the current study, students also improve in response to the provision of rewards. In 
aggregated terms, students who compete for financial (reputational) rewards score 0.176 
(0.102) SD higher than control-group students. Again, Jalava et al. (2015) find similar results. In 
their study, students who competed for a certificate improved their performance by 0.083 SD. 
Students who competed for (non-monetary) prizes improved by 0.125 SD. Blimpo (2014) 
studied the effects of financial rewards provided to students in Benin on an individual or 
 
Table 1.3: Aggregated average treatment effects of the provision of feedback and rewards on the overall 
performance and students’ subjective well-being 
 
 
Dependent variable: STUDENTS’ OVERALL PERFORMANCE STRESS HAPPINESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Aggregated feedback treatment  
    pooled 
Aggregated reward treatment    






























Within-class social comparison,  
    aggregated 
Across-class social comparison,  
    aggregated  
Financial Rewards,  
    aggregated 
Reputational Rewards, 
    aggregated 
 


















































































Note: OLS. Pooled aggregated feedback treatment effect consists of the aggregated treatment effects of within- and across-class 
feedbacks. Pooled aggregated reward treatment effect consists of the aggregated treatment effect of financial and reputational 
rewards. Columns (1) – (4) show the aggregated average treatment effects (ATE) of differently aggregated treatments on 
students’ overall performance. Columns (5) and (6) represent the average treatment effects on students’ well-being (stress and 
happiness respectively). Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations).     
Full table with coefficients for stratification variables can be found in Appendix C1.10. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
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group basis. Students improved their performance by 0.27 to 0.34 SD. Blimpo’s (2014) 
treatment effects are comparable in size to the results of the current study once I decompose the 
treatment effects into only feedback, only rewards and feedback-reward interaction treatments.  
Being informed (in the form of repeated feedback) seems to play a role in the effect size 
of the rewards. While rewarded students without feedback improved by 0.06-0.13 SD, students 
exposed to repeated feedback improved their performance by 0.12 to 0.28 SD (see Figure 1.1). In 
other words, students who received repeated feedback and competed for rewards outperformed 
the control group by 2.4 to 6.2 percentage points more compared to students who competed 
only for rewards.  
One caveat must be considered when I compare the effects of rewards to the effects of 
feedback. While feedback was provided to students repeatedly during the whole academic year, 
students competed for rewards only once23. In order to compare the immediate average 
treatment effects of feedback to average treatment effects of rewards, I compare the estimates 
from Round 2 (Round 3 for across-class feedback) controlling for the baseline performance to 
estimates from Round 5 controlling for the performance of students in Round 4. These 
comparisons should capture the differences in immediate responses of students to the feedback 
and rewards. For further details regarding alternative comparisons see Appendix C1.3, 1.4 and 
1.8. Students who competed for financial rewards significantly outperformed students who 
received feedback in all scenarios. Students who competed for reputational rewards scored 
similarly to students in feedback treatment groups in most scenarios compared.  
 
                                                 
 
23 It would be interesting in future research to observe how students’ performance and their well-being would 
change if they faced competition for rewards repeatedly. 
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The effects on students’ performance differ in Math and English. While the effects of 
feedback are driven solely by improvements in Math, rewards lead to similar improvements in 
both subjects as can be seen in Table 1.4. One explanation is that Math is more elastic (Bettinger, 
2012), in the sense that it may be easier to detect the areas of Math in which the student is 
failing, e.g. multiplications, and focus on improvements in such area, while in English it may be 
hard to detect problematic areas and prepare for the test. If this is the case in the research 
presented here, the patterns should be, however, similar across all treatment groups, which is 
not the case. An alternative explanation comes from the overall motivation. Students may have 
low motivation to study science, which is often perceived as more difficult24 and students may 
not see its usefulness in real life; but once they are incentivized (students see real rewards 
instead of abstract future benefits), they improve. Finally, rewards may have stronger 
motivatory power for subjects to remain in a competition compared to the feedback, which, in 
combination with order effect (the Math examination always preceded the English examination), 
could explain why subjects with rewards improve in both subjects while students with feedback 
potentially lost their motivation and improved only in Math. Current data show that students in 
the control group, whose performance is mimicking student evolution in absence of the 
treatments, have stagnated in Math across the academic year (their absolute performance 
decreased by 0.33%) but their absolute score in English increased by 50.25%. Based on such 
progress, it may be easier to improve in Math compared to English. A significant improvement in 
Math but not in English can be also found in other studies, e.g., Bettinger (2012) or Reardon et al. 
(2009). The evolution of the treatment effect can be found in Figure 1.2. 
 
                                                 
 
24 Judging also by a consistently lower number of applicants for Science subjects as opposed to Arts subjects in the 
National examinations held by the Ugandan National Board Examination Committee.  
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Table 1.4: Aggregated average treatment effects of the provision of feedback and rewards performance in 
Math and English 
 
 
Dependent variable: MATH ENGLISH 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Aggregated feedback treatment 
 





















Within-class social comparison (T1) 
 
Across-class social comparison (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards  
 
Reputational Rewards  
 




















  0.142* 
 (0.078) 


















     -0.028 
(0.039) 
      0.012 
 (0.040) 
     0.158** 
 (0.065) 






Note: OLS. Columns (1) – (2) show the average treatment effects (ATE) of differently aggregated treatments on students’ 
performance in Math, columns (3) and (4) in English. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in 
national examinations).* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
 




1.4.2 Average Treatment Effects on Students’ Well-Being (Stress and Happiness)  
Both types of feedback left students’ stress level unchanged, but the within-class feedback 
slightly decreased their happiness by 0.111 SD. The stress was induced when the feedback group 
students competed for rewards. Rewards, on the contrary, significantly increased the stress level 
of students and decreased students’ happiness25. Decomposition of the aggregate treatment 
effects sheds more light on this performance-well-being-trade-off. Students without feedback 
who were competing for money reported their stress level as 0.466 SD higher compared to the 
control-group students. In other words, these students reported higher stress levels compared 
to 67.9% of the control-group students who received no feedback and no rewards.  
Students who received repeated feedback reported significantly lower stress compared 
to the uninformed ones in the competition for money. While students in the within-class 
feedback group reported their stress level as 47.6% lower compared to the group without 
feedback, students in the across-class feedback group reported similar stress levels to students 
who were not in the competition. On the other hand, students who competed for reputational 
rewards without feedback reported comparable levels of stress to the control-group students 
but significantly higher stress if they received feedback26.  
In terms of happiness, students who competed for money reported lower happiness 
compared to control-group students and whether students received feedback or not did not play 
a significant role. Provision of reputational rewards only influenced the happiness level of 
                                                 
 
25 In aggregated terms, financial rewards increased stress by 0.226 SD and reputational rewards by 0.177 SD; 
students’ happiness decreased by 0.1 SD.  
26 Students who received within-class (across-class) feedback reported their stress as 0.196 SD (0.237 SD) higher 
compared to the control group students. In terms of percentages, students who received repeated within-class 
(across-class) feedback reported higher stress level in response to reputational rewards compared to 57.7% 
(59.4%) of students who received no feedback but competed for the rewards (the differences are only significant at 
15%). 
52 
students enrolled in the across-class feedback group. Controlling for the baseline stress and 
happiness levels does not change the results significantly (see Appendix C1.5, C1.6 and C1.7).  
A policy maximizer who would want to minimize the effects of interventions on students’ 
well-being should therefore consider a class-level competition for financial rewards with regular 
feedback on each student’s own performance and the performance of her class – students’ 
performance should thus increase with no significant effect on stress or happiness. 
1.4.3 Endogeneity between Performance and Stress 
Provisions of feedback and/or rewards influenced performance, stress and happiness. 
Stress can increase because students are compared and/or they compete for rewards. Stress can 
influence performance (positively, if they focus better and increase their effort, or negatively, if 
they make more mistakes). Performance can, however, induce an increased stress level (either 
because students did not meet their expectations or because they internalize that their 
individual outcomes influenced the results of the whole group). Therefore the important 
question is whether students whose performance improved in response to the treatments are 
also those whose stress level increased.  Changes in performance and stress are endogenous and 
I lack a proper instrumental variable to separate the treatment effects. To shed light on the 
problem I proceed with three exercises shown in Tables 1.5 and 1.6 (see also Appendix C1.9). 
The results suggest that the treatment effects of incentives are heterogeneous, i.e., students who 
improved their performance in response to incentives are not necessarily those whose stress 
increased/happiness decreased.  
First, I regress students’ performance in the final testing on all treatment dummies 
(column 1 in Table 1.5), on changes in stress (column 2) and all treatment dummies with 
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changes in stress (column 3). The effect sizes and their significance levels are comparable in all 
three cases. R-squared values and standard errors are also similar. Second, assuming that the 
effect of incentives on performance is driven through a change in stress (a strong but necessary 
assumption for this exercise), I use feedback and reward treatments as instruments for changes 
in stress, which are then used as a predictor of overall performance in the second stage 
regression, to estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (Table 1.6). First stage 
regressions suggest that excepting pure within-class treatment and reputational rewards 
interacted with both types of feedback, all other treatments predict a change in stress level. The 
resulting coefficient in the second stage is insignificant. The results of the Kleibergen-Paap LM 
test reports that the model is identified. Stock and Yogo test results in F-statistics equal to 4.121, 
which compared to Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values suggest that the instruments are  
 
Table 1.5: Sensitivity analysis and regression by the level of stress  
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Change in stress  
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     0.194*** 
(0.063) 
   0.124** 
(0.056) 











      0.213*** 
 (0.066) 
























Note: OLS regressions on full sample (columns 1,2, and 3) or separately for students whose stress level 
increased/decreased/remained unchanged (columns 4 and 5). I control for stratification variables in the regressions – area, 
school level and results in national examinations (dummy variable which equals 1 if above the average).   * significant at 10%; ** 
at 5%; *** at 1%. 
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Table 1.6: Performance and change in stress: Average treatment effect on the treated  
 
 
Panel A: OLS and IV regressions 
Dependent variable: Performance 
Estimated method: OLS regression 
IV 
regression 
Change in stress  
 
Initial performance level 
 
Kleibergen-Paap statistic 
Controlled for strata 
Adjusted R-squared 
F-statistics/Wald chi2(df) 
Number of observation 
   -0.007*** 
(0.003) 

















Endogeneity test%  
p=0.979 
p=0.842 
Panel B: First-stage regressions 
Dependent variable: Change in stress level 
Estimated method: OLS regression 
Within-class feedback,  
     no feedback (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback,  
     no feedback (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards,  
     no feedback (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards,  
     no feedback (Rep_solo) 
Within-class feedback,  
     monetary reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback,  
     monetary reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback,  
     reputat.reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback,  
     reputat.reward (T2_rep) 
Initial performance level 
 
F statistics 
Controlled for strata 
Adjusted R-squared 























Note: OLS and 2SLS regressions with robust standard errors clustered at class level. Feedback and reward treatments are used 
as instruments for change in stress. I control for stratification variables in the regressions – area, school level and results in 
national examinations (dummy variable which equals 1 if above the average); % endogeneity test based on the difference of two 
Sargan-Hansen statistics. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
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weak. In order to test for the presence of endogeneity I conducted the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
and the p-value implied that the suspected variable is not endogenous (p-value equaled 0.979). I 
also used an endogeneity test based on the difference of two Sargan-Hansen statistics which 
resulted again in the OLS estimates being consistent; i.e., students whose performance level 
changed in response to the proposed treatments are not the ones whose stress levels changed. 
Lastly, the decomposition of the average treatment effects by change in stress level also shows 
heterogeneity in results (columns 4 and 5 in Table 1.5). The effects of incentives on performance 
are similar for students whose stress level decreased or increased, which is in line with the 
heterogeneity of the treatment effects. The proposed treatments had impact on performance and 
well-being. The current experimental design, however, cannot distinguish the channels. 
1.4.4 Group Composition  
If students are allowed to choose whether they want to compete in groups or as 
individuals, the studies have shown that average-ability subjects have a higher tendency to 
choose group-work compared to high- or poor-ability subjects (Amann and Gall, 2006, Breton et 
al., 1998, 2003). In this study, I am interested in the behavior of students exogenously grouped 
with others from the whole ability-spectrum. Students were assigned to groups of three and 
received feedback about their own as well as group performance during the whole academic 
year. In some cases the number of students in the class was not divisible by three, in which case 
there were one or two groups of four students (in total 18 of 717 groups). In the following 
analysis I take only three-person groups into account. 
Three types of ability groups (poor, mixed and good performers) and four types of gender 
groups (all boys, two boys and one girl, one boy and two girls, or all girls) were formed. The 
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analysis helps us to understand how well-informed groups who differ in terms of ability or 
gender composition perform in response to financial and reputational rewards.  
The applicability of the results goes beyond the educational framework. Groups are 
increasingly used in decision-making processes in organizations (Hamilton et al., 2003; Woolley 
et al., 2010). Companies spend large amounts of money on incentivizing employees. With the 
aim of maximizing efficiency or group performance they often carefully select high-ability 
performers to work on a project or represent the firm, etc. In such an environment the results of 
this research offer comparison of responses of different ability groups with or without further 
incentives. 
1.4.4.1 Ability Composition 
The aim is to observe whether and to what extent students randomized into within-class 
feedback groups differ in responses to rewards based on their initial group achievements. Group 
achievement is measured in terms of group baseline performance in Math and in English. I 
differentiate three types of groups: (1) high-achievers if all group-members scored above the 
median; (2) poor-achievers if all group-members scored below the median; or (3) mixed-
achievers if the performance of group-members varied across the whole performance 
distribution. Ability is not directly observable, but I use student performance as a proxy for 
ability and in later discussion I denote the groups as high-ability, poor-ability, and mixed-ability.   
The main result is that groups of mixed-ability students can perform similarly to high-
ability groups if they are provided with incentives. The type of rewards matter for 
improvements in English: students competing for money improved by 0.164 SD more compared 
to those competing for reputational rewards, significant at α=5%. 
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Students in mixed-ability groups who were not enrolled in a competition for rewards 
performed similarly to students in poor-ability groups in Math, but they outperformed them in 
English by 0.133 SD. Once mixed-ability groups are incentivized, they significantly outperformed 
poor-ability students both in Math (0.21-0.22 SD) and English (0.38 SD and 0.224 SD in response 
to the financial and reputational rewards, respectively. The treatment effects were driven by 
those students in the mixed-ability groups who scored below median in the baseline testing.  
Students in the high-ability groups who did not compete for rewards significantly 
outperformed students in the poor-ability groups by 0.451 SD in Math and 0.387 SD in English 
and therefore outperformed poor-ability students by 65 - 67.5%. There is no statistically 
significant value added to provision of rewards for high-ability group students as seen also in 
Figure 1.3 below. See also Appendix E1.1. 
 





Note: OLS. All groups received within-class feedback during the whole academic year. The bars show the average treatment 
effects of different incentive schemes of mixed- and high-ability groups in comparison to poor-ability groups. Vertical error bars 
show robust standard errors. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). 
Stars indicate significance of the difference in means.   * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
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Except in two cases, students do not differ across different ability groups in perceived 
stress and happiness. The average student from the mixed-ability group incurred higher stress 
compared to 62.2% of the poor-ability group students when offered financial rewards, and the 
average high-ability group student incurred higher stress compared to 62.6% of the poor-ability 
students when offered reputational rewards. Ability-composition of the groups does not seem to 
determine the level of effort exerted to answering the exam questions. 
1.4.4.2 Gender Composition 
Group performance may also be influenced by its gender composition. Apesteguia et al. 
(2012) studied the effects of gender compositions on the economic performance of 
undergraduate and MBA students involved in a business game competition.  All-male and mixed-
gender groups outperformed all-female groups. (In other words groups consisting of all women 
served as the comparison group.) The group composition of two men and one woman seemed to 
be optimal since they performed the best. In the current study the groups also consisted of three 
students and due to random assignment, four different gender-compositions were formed (all-
girls, majority girls, majority boys and all-boys). The findings are similar. Mixed groups 
outperform single-gender groups, although I do not find strong support in the current study for 
the groups of two boys and one girl to be dominant.  
Figure 1.4 compares the performance of mixed groups and groups of boys compared to 
groups of girls (see also Appendix E1.2). The results suggest that in the absence of rewards, 
mixed gender groups outperformed single-gender groups by 0.16 - 0.18 SD. All-boys groups 
performed comparably to all-girls groups. When rewards were offered, all-female groups were 
outperformed by all other types of groups from 0.19 to 0.50 SD depending on the group gender 
59 
composition and type of the rewards. Group composition does not seem to play a significant role 
in terms of students’ perceived stress in reaction to different treatments. All-girls groups seem 
to be on average happier than other groups27. 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Average treatment effects among within-class feedback groups, by baseline gender 





Note: OLS. All groups received within-class feedback during the whole academic year. 3 Boys denotes groups consisting of boys 
only, 2B1G groups of two boys and one girl, 1B2G one boy and two girls. Groups consisting of all-girls served as comparison 
groups. The bars show the average treatment effects of different incentive schemes of 3-boy-groups and mixed-groups in 
comparison to 3-girl-groups. Vertical error bars show robust standard errors. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and 
school performance in national examinations). Stars indicate significance of the difference in means. * significant at 10%; ** at 
5%; *** at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
 
27 Testing the differences in happiness levels in the baseline survey shows that groups of 3 females did not 
significantly differ in terms of their happiness compared to groups of 3 boys and groups of 1-boy-2-girls. The 
difference between 3-girls and 2-boy-1-girl groups is significant at 10% level (p=0.088). All other groups are 
comparably happy. 
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1.4.5 Distributional Analysis   
It is also important to learn whether the treatment effect differs at different points of the 
performance distribution. To learn to what extent high performing students (those in the upper 
tail of the performance distribution) differ in their reactions to the treatment effects from low 
performing students, I estimate quantile regressions. Figure 1.5 shows the average treatment 
effect of the incentives on student performance of students by their rank in the performance 
distribution. The figure consists of four graphs that differ in the combinations of the treatments. 
Graphs in the first column compare the average treatment effects of the sole feedback with 
feedback-reward interacted treatments. Graphs in the second column compare average 




Note: T1_solo stands for within-class feedback without further rewards, T1 with money/newspaper stands for within-class 
feedback and further monetary/non-monetary rewards.  
Figure 1.5: Distribution of the average treatment effects of different incentives on overall performance 
(Math and English pooled), by deciles 
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observation is that the bottom performers responded more strongly than the top performers to 
sole financial rewards, sole across-class feedback or their combination. In all other cases the 
bottom performers responded comparably to the top performers.  
 
1.4.6 Positiveness and Negativeness of Feedback and Well-Being 
  
 
The nature of the feedback students receive may influence their well-being.  Azmat and 
Iriberri (2016) show that positive feedback increases students’ happiness. In the current study, 
students received feedback regarding their own performance together with information about 
the absolute and relative performance of their group. They were also informed whether they 
improved or worsened in the two subsequent testing rounds. Students are considered as 
receiving mostly positive (negative) feedback if in at least two out of three cases they improved 
(worsened). 
I find similar results to Azmat and Iriberri (2016) but mainly for students outside of the 
competition for rewards.28 Students enrolled in a competition reported higher happiness only in 
the case of competition for money combined with across-class feedback (see also Table 1.7). The 




                                                 
 
28 The within-class (across-class) feedback group who received mostly positive feedback reported higher happiness 
than 55.2% (58.9%) of the students in the within-class (across-class) feedback group who received mostly negative 
feedback. 
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Dependent variable: Stress Happiness 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Within-class feedback  
     aggregated 
Within-class feedback, no  
     rewards 
Within-class feedback with  
     monetary rewards 
Within-class feedback with  
     reputational rewards  
 
Number of observations 


















































Across-class feedback  
     aggregated 
Across-class feedback, no  
     rewards 
Across-class feedback with  
     monetary rewards  
Across-class feedback with  
     reputational rewards 
 
Number of observations 


















































Note: OLS. Students who received mostly positive feedback are compared to students who received mostly negative feedback. 
Columns (1) and (3) show aggregated treatment effects, columns (2) and (4) disaggregated. Controlled for stratum fixed effects 
(area, level and school performance in national examinations).* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
 
1.4.7 Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation 
Psychologists found that monetary and non-monetary incentives, despite their positive 
effects in the short run, may in the long run worsen students’ performance due to decreases in 
subjects’ intrinsic motivation,29 and lowered interest in the task (Deci, 1971; Deci et al., 1999; 
Benabour and Tirole, 2003; and Frey and Jegen, 2000). In this study, I do not have any direct 
                                                 
 
29 Definition of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation can be found in Ryan, and Deci, 2000. 
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measure of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. However, immediately after the last exam from 
Math and English, I asked students how much time they spent on preparing for the exam. This 
self-reported measure of effort may serve as a proxy for motivation. The results show that 
students involved in a competition for rewards reported that they exerted significantly less 
effort on exam preparation than the control group students. The results are similar by gender. 
For further details see Appendix F1.6. 
1.4.8 Treatment Effects on Attrition 
High drop-out and absence rates are common issues with students in developing 
countries and there is no exception in my data. There are several reasons30. Some students did 
not have the money to pay the school fees and decided to change schools to avoid repaying their 
debt, others changed their school for family reasons (the family moved to a different area, they 
were sent to live with other family members, etc.). Some completely dropped out of school. Some 
just registered as new students. Some passed away. Due to the constraints of the experiment, all 
participation data are based on our scheduled visits only (no random visits were organized). 
Estimates of treatment effects can be biased if the attrition from control versus treatment 
groups differs systematically and the difference is caused by the presence of the treatment. 
Students in treatment groups attrite less often in absolute values and are more often present in 
all five testing rounds compared to their control-group counterparts. In order to see whether 
and to what extent social comparison and reward treatments influence the probability of 
                                                 
 
30 All answers are based on the questionnaires filled out by headmasters, directors and teachers. 
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dropping out. I run a probit model on attrition and full attendance on all treatment dummies 
controlling for strata variables (Table 1.8).  
The attrition rate includes students who missed our last testing round but attended the 
baseline testing at the beginning of the project. Non-rewarded students exposed to both within 
and across-class social comparison feedback had from 6.5 to 6.9% lower probability of missing 
the final testing round. Among rewarded students who did not receive any feedback only  
 






Absence rates Students present in all testing rounds 
Overall Girls Boys Overall Girls Boys 
NON-INTERACTED 
TREATMENT EFFECTS 
Within-class feedback,  
     no rewards (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback,  
     no rewards (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards,  
     no feedback (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards,   
     no feedback (Rep_solo) 
 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback with  
     reputation rewards (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback with    
     reputation rewards (T2_rep) 
 
Controlled for stratas 






















































































  0.233*** 
(0.062) 
  0.263*** 
(0.060) 












































  0.247*** 
(0.064) 
  0.252*** 
(0.063) 








Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four 
areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national examination and grade level - P6,P7, S1 up to 




students rewarded financially lowered their attrition by 7.9%. Reputation rewards without 
provided feedback do not affect attrition rate. All treatment interactions lowered the attrition 
rate (from 9.3 to 17.2%). There are no gender differences in terms of decrease in absence rates 
or increase in attendance rates. Similarly, no differences can be attributed to group gender 
composition. On the other hand, groups consisting of higher (mixed) achieving students as 
determined by baseline performance have an 11.9% (7.79%) lower probability to attrite 
compared to the poor-achievers group.  
In sections 1.6.2. and 1.6.3 I discuss whether lower absence rates among treated students 
may potentially reintroduce selection bias. I also estimate the treatment effects using alternative 
specifications such as inverse probability weighting, median regression and two imputed 
methods to correct for potential selection bias. The results are similar to OLS results. Provision 
of feedback and rewards, therefore, potentially lower absence rates, which is an interesting result 
on its own and could be potentially tested in future work.  
1.5 Gender Differences and the Channels of the Average Treatment 
Effects  
Girls have performed differently than boys in various studies. Angrist and Lavy (2009) 
studied the effects of cash incentives on matriculation rates among Israeli students. Girls, 
contrary to boys, substantially increased their performance. A greater effect among girls was 
also found in the analysis of voucher provision within the PACES program in Colombia (Angrist 
et al., 2002). Stronger responsiveness to incentives among girls can be also found in studies of 
tuition provision by Dynarski (2008), early childhood interventions by Anderson (2008), 
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housing vouchers by Kling et al. (2007) and public sector programs by Lalonde (1995) and 
others31. 
The results of the current experiment show that girls reacted positively to feedback (0.12 
– 0.14 SD) even if they were not offered rewards. Once involved in a competitive environment, 
girls improved by 0.2 to 0.28 SD (see Appendix D1). Therefore, girls can improve similarly to 
boys if they receive feedback about their performance, the performance of their group and their 
group’s relative standing. In the absence of feedback, girls did not improve at all. Boys improved 
if they were offered rewards (with or without feedback) by 0.18 to 0.28 SD but did not react to 
feedback alone.  
Figures 1.6 and 1.7 compare the treatment effects across the whole performance 
distribution by gender. While girls from the bottom of the performance distribution seem to be 
the most responsive to incentives, the most responsive boys are from the middle of the 
performance distribution.  The results from quantile regressions can be found in Appendices 
F1.4 and F1.5. There are no gender differences from different incentive schemes on students’ 
psychological well-being. Similar results can be found in Azmat and Iriberri (2016). The results 
are also in line with the literature on stereotype thread that boys are typically considered to be 
stronger in Mathematics (Muzzatti and Agnoli, 2007). Stereotype thread could explain why girls 
underperform boys in competition without feedback but perform similarly if feedback is 
provided. “[P]ublicly revealing the social identity of an individual can change his behavior even 
when that information is irrelevant to payoffs” (Hoff and Pandey, 2006). 
 
 
                                                 
 
31 For a review of gender differences in risk preferences, other-regarding preferences and competitive preferences, 




Note: T1_solo stands for within-class feedback without further rewards, T1 with money/newspaper stands for within-class 






Note: T1_solo stands for within-class feedback without further rewards, T1 with money/newspaper stands for within-class 
feedback and further monetary/non-monetary rewards.  
Figure 1.6: Comparison of the sizes of the average treatment effects on girls’ performance in Math and 
English, by deciles  
Figure 1.7: Comparison of the sizes of the average treatment effects on boys’ performance in Math and 
English, by deciles 
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1.6 Robustness Checks 
1.6.1 Multiple Comparisons 
The probability that the coefficients are significant purely by chance increases with the 
number of hypotheses tested. Multiple-test procedures take p-values from multiple comparisons 
testing and uncorrected critical p-values interpreted either as familywise error rate (FWER) or 
as false discovery rate (FDR) and result in adjusted critical p-values.32   
In order to address these concerns about multiple inference I control for FWER using 
one-step methods (Bonferroni, in Dunn 1961; and Sidak, 1967 corrections), and step-down 
methods (Holm, 1979; and Holland-Copenhaver, 1987 corrections) and for FDR, using step-up 
methods (Simes, 1986; Hochberge, 1988; and Yakutieli-Benjamini, 2001 procedure). A detailed 
description of the procedures can be found in Newson (2010). The corrected p-values are 
summarized in Table 1.9. 
 
Table 1.9: Adjusted p-values for aggregated treatment effects and disaggregated treatment effects 












 One-step method Bonferroni correction Arbitrary 0.0077 0.0053 
Sidak correction Nonnegative 0.0081 0.0055 
Step-down method Holm correction Arbitrary 0.0200 0.0083 




Hochberg correction Independence 0.0170 0.0077 
Simes correction Nonnegative 0.0620 0.0680 
Yekutieli correction Arbitrary 0.0190 0.0150 
 
                                                 
 
32 “If the input uncorrected critical p-value α ∈ (0,1) is an FWER, then we can be 100(1 − α)% confident that all the 
null hypotheses in the discovery set are false. If the input uncorrected critical p-value α = β ∗ γ is an FDR, then we 
can be 100(1 − β)% confident that over 100(1 − γ)% of the null hypotheses in the discovery set are false” (Newson, 
2010, p.569). 
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The disadvantage of FWER is that it can result in low power for testing single hypotheses 
in large experiments with high numbers of multiple comparisons. In such cases FDR is preferred 
since it controls for the proportion of Type I errors to true positives and therefore results in 
greater power. In the case of this experiment, one-step and step-down methods rule out any of 
the initially presented average treatment effects of interventions on students’ performance. 
FWER procedures seem to be too conservative due to the number of multiple comparisons I test.  
Among FDR procedures I rule out the Hochberg corrections because I do not meet its 
restriction of independence (Hochberge, 1988; Newson, 2010) since I compare all groups with 
treatments to the same control group. The significance of the average treatment effects of 
different incentive schemes on students’ performance was confirmed when I used the Simes 
correction and, with some exception, when I used the Yekutieli correction. For instance, the 
effect of sole financial rewards and financial rewards combined with within-class feedback is 
insignificant. Similarly, regarding the average treatment effects on subjective well-being, with 
one exception, the negative impact of sole financial rewards is significant using all types of 
FWER and FDR corrections. A summary of corrected p-values for all disaggregated treatment 
effects can be found in Appendices F1.7a, b, and c.   
1.6.2 Who are the Attrited Students? Random versus Non-Random Attrition  
The treatments influenced the probability of students’ presence or absence for our visits. 
In absolute numbers, fewer students dropped out from treated classes and more students from 
the treatment groups attended all five testing rounds compared to the control group students. 
Further, those who attrited from the within-class feedback group are worse in terms of their 
initial performance compared to students from the across-class feedback group or the control 
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group. That might re-introduce a bias if the treated students who are present during the final 
testing round are systematically different compared to the control-group students. As shown in 
Table 1.10, this is not the case in this project. The distribution of students who remained 
throughout the year in either treatment group (based on their initial performance) is not 
statistically different from the distribution of the initial abilities of students from the control 
group. Therefore, the OLS estimate should provide unbiased estimates of the treatment effects. 
Nevertheless, I use inverse probability weights and imputation methods to check the stability of 
the results (see section 1.6.3). 
 
Table 1.10: Ksmirnov test on equality of distributions; by students’ absence/presence rates  
 
 


































Note: P-values reported. T1 stands for within-class social comparison group, T2 for across-class comparison group and C 
represents control group with no feedback provided.  “Students who attrited” stands for students who were present in the 
baseline but not in endline testing. “Students who stayed” were present in both baseline and endline but may have been absent 
in Round 2,3, and/or 4. “Always-present students” participated in all testing rounds.  
  
1.6.3 Stability of the Results 
 
In order to adjust the results for non-random attrition, I proceed with imputation 
methods and inverse probability-weighted regressions (Imbens, 2004; Woolridge, 2007; Kwak 
(2010); Hirano et al., 2000, etc.). Inverse probability weighting (IPW) can adjust for confounding 
factors and selection bias. As the title suggests, IPW assigns a weight to every student that is 
equal to the student’s inverse probability to being absent and adjusts for that in the estimation 
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of the treatment effects. An imputation method is used to fill in the missing observations of 
students who were absent or dropped out in the last testing round based on a predefined rule. 
Tables 1.11 and 1.1233 provide a comparison of ordinary least squares estimations 
(column 1) of the treatment effects to the weighted least squares using inverse probability  
 
Table 1.11: Average treatment effects of different motivation schemes - alternative specifications 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
 
Estimation method:  
Math 







Within-class feedback, no rewards  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no rewards  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards, no feedback   
     (Rep_solo) 
 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback, with  
     monetary reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, with  
     monetary reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, with  
     reputation reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, with  
     reputation reward (T2_rep) 
 
Controlled for stratas 
F-statistics 















  0.277** 
(0.139) 
  0.209** 
(0.103) 














































































Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four 
areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national examination and grade level (P6,P7, S1 up to 
S4). N stands for the number of observations. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
                                                 
 
33 See also Appendices F1.1, F1.2 and F1.3. 
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weights (column 2), separately for Math and English. Correcting for the probability of dropping 
out, treatment effects are similar or slightly higher in absolute terms but not significantly 
different.  The results of the imputation methods (columns 3 and 4) bring similar conclusions.  
I use two different measures to impute missing observations – median ratio and the class 
percentile ranks (inspired by Krueger, 1999). All of the measures take the advantage of repeated 
school visits and follow the same logic – if the observation from the last school visit is missing, I  
 














Within-class feedback, no rewards  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no rewards  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards, no feedback   
     (Rep_solo) 
 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback, with  
     monetary reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, with  
     monetary reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, with  
     reputation reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, with  
     reputation reward (T2_rep) 
 
Controlled for stratas 
F-statistics 

































































































Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four 
areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national examination and grade level (P6,P7, S1 up to 




look at the last score available and adjust for the differences in test difficulty. The same 
procedure is done to impute Math and English scores separately. The median ratio measure 
imputes the last available observation and the class percentile ranks take into consideration the 
rank of the student in the last available distribution and impute the score corresponding to the 
student of the same rank in the final visit distribution. The imputation method artificially fills 
missing observations and the results serve only as bounds. Both imputation measures deliver 
similar or stronger results compared to ordinary least squares. Ordinary least squares results 
are also comparable to the weighted regression estimates. 
1.7 Conclusion   
Various interventions have been conducted in educational literature with the aim of 
lowering absenteeism and increasing student performance. Researchers usually focus on the 
main outcomes of their interventions, such as subjects’ performance, absence or drop-out rates, 
leaving outcomes other than learning aside. Evidence from psychology indicates that well-being, 
measured in terms of stress and happiness, serves as an important precursor of future 
performance. This paper contributes to the current literature by studying the effects of various 
types of incentives on student performance and their well-being (measured by reported 
happiness and stress levels). I bring new evidence of the performance-versus-well-being 
tradeoff by implementing two types of social comparative feedback regimes (within- and across-
class group feedback), two types of incentive regimes - financial and reputation rewards, and 
their combinations.   
The results of this study show that students who received repeated feedback without 
further incentivization mildly improved their performance compared to the control group 
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students, but the difference was insignificant. The results differ in Math and in English. While in 
Math, students improved significantly by 0.08 to 0.13 SD, there was no improvement in English. 
The results are driven by improvements in girls’ performance. Provision of rewards (students 
did not receive feedback), on the contrary led to an improvement of 0.1 to 0.18 SD in both Math 
and English. These results are driven by boys. The design of the experiment allows me to study 
only immediate effects of the provision of rewards. Future studies could therefore focus on the 
effects of repeated competition for rewards. Students improved significantly more in response 
to rewards compared to the immediate feedback (measured by their performance right after 
first feedback provision). The difference is not significant when I compare the average treatment 
effects of rewards to repeated feedback (measured by the performance in the final testing 
round).  
Students exposed to the combined incentive scheme of feedback with rewards increased 
their performance by 0.20 and 0.29 SD if rewarded financially and 0.12 to 0.18 SD if rewarded 
reputationally. There is, however, a trade-off between improvements in performance and 
changes in students’ well-being in response to different incentive schemes. While students 
exposed to feedback and reputational rewards improved their performance mildly compared to 
the control group students, neither their happiness nor stress changed. Financial rewards led to 
stronger improvements in performance but were associated with higher stress and lower 
happiness. Being informed seems to play a role in terms of stress. Students involved in a 
competition for monetary rewards reported significantly lower stress levels compared to those 
who competed for money without feedback. Stressed students exerted less effort, performed 
worse on average and attrited by 29% more compared to more relaxed students.  
75 
Furthermore, this paper sheds light on gender differences in responsiveness to different 
incentive types. According to the results, girls did not improve when they received no feedback 
but they competed for rewards of any type and significantly underperformed boys. If the girls 
were repeatedly given feedback (and the type of feedback does not matter), they performed 
comparably to boys. Moreover, girls also responded positively to sole feedback (without 
rewards). Comparative feedback played a crucial role for girls in enhancing their performance in 
a tournament environment. Boys reacted only with respect to rewards. Feedback did not play 
any role in their performance improvements. There were no gender-differences in the effects of 
incentives on well-being. 
The results of the current experiment may be of importance especially for policy makers 
developing strategies to improve the performance and well-being of primary and secondary 
school students. The results call attention to the impact of incentives on students’ stress and 
happiness. The current study cannot distinguish whether “short-term pain is for longer-term 
gain”, in other words it is not clear whether an increase in stress could serve as a motivator for 
better performance in the longer run. Stress has been found to be related to higher absence 
rates, and high absenteeism is a prevalent problem of developing countries, and could 
potentially influence students’ career choices, too. Therefore policy makers should exercise a 
great deal of caution in designing educational rewards and consider the impact on student well-
being.. The goal of the current study is solely to point out another dark side of incentives and 






APPENDIX A1: Summary statistics and randomization balance 
Appendix A1.1: Balance between control and treatment groups  
 




School Level:  
The number of primary schools 
The number of secondary schools 
  







By PLE/UCE results 
 












































Note: min(PLE/UCE)= 1.7397, max(PLE/UCE)= 4.2857, mean(PLE/UCE)=3.1040 























Appendix A1.2: Randomization balance. aggregated treatments 
 
 






















(T2 – C) 
A.  QUESTIONNAIRES 
A.1 After Math questionnaire 
Q1: Expected number of points  
       [min 1, max 10] 
Q2: Subjective effort level  
       [min 1, max 5] 
Q3: Perceived difficulty  
       [min 1, max 5] 
Q4: Subjective level of happiness                
       [min 1, max 7] 
 
A.2 After English questionnaire 
Q1: Expected number of points  
       [min 1, max 10] 
Q2: Subjective effort level  
       [min 1, max 5] 
Q3: Perceived difficulty  
       [min 1, max 5] 
Q4: Subjective level of happiness  
        [min 1, max 7] 
 
A.3 Aspiration questionnaire 
Education over Relax 
       [min 1, max 5] 
Education over Work 
       [min 1, max 5] 
Work over Relax 
       [min 1, max 5] 
Perceived happiness scale  
       [min 4, max 28] 
Perceived stress  























































































































































































Note: comparison of mean characteristics of students in treatment and control groups. T1/T2 stands for within-/across- class 
social comparison groups and C for control gropu. Robust clustered standard errors at class level are in parentheses, adjusted for 









Appendix A1.2: Randomization balance, aggregated treatments (Continued) 
 
 






















(T2 – C) 
B. OTHER 
B.1 Attrition rates 





















































































































































Note: comparison of mean characteristics of students in treatment and control groups. T1/T2 stands for within-/across- class 
social comparison groups and C for control group. Robust clustered standard errors at class level are in parentheses, adjusted for 
stratification. There was one school which experienced substantial reorganization (though exogenous to the intervention) 
resulting in a change in headmaster and a high number of student dropouts. Restricted sample (#) excludes that school from the 
analysis. Attrition rate is defined as the number of students missing in the last testing round conditional on student participation 
















Appendix A1.3: Randomization balance, by treatment decomposition 
 




























Within-class competition with no  
     rewards (T1_solo) 
Across-class competition with no  
     rewards (T2_solo) 
Financial rewards with no  
     feedback (Fin_solo) 
Reputation rewards with no  
     feedback (Rep_solo) 
 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class competition with    
     financial rewards (T1_FIN) 
Across-class competition with    
     financial rewards (T2_FIN) 
Within-class competition with  
     reputation rewards (T1_REP) 
Across-class competition with   





















































































































































Note: Mean comparisons. Columns (1), (3) and (5) represent average scores from sum of Math and English, and separate scores 
by subject. Columns (2), (4), (6) represent differences between a particular treatment and the control group which received no 
feedback or reward). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at school level are in parentheses; adjusted for stratification. 











Appendix A1.4: Randomization balance, by treatment decomposition 
 
 
Note: y-axis represents minimal detectable effect size given parameters, x-axis shows the number of clusters required for a 
particular desired effect size; α is conventional significance level, K is the total number of sites, 𝜎𝛿2 represents effect size 
variability, P stands for desired power (typically set to 0.800); relL2 stands for cluster level reliability, and B stands for the 
proportion of explained variance by the blocking variable(s). The result shows that for a given number of clusters (146 classes) 













APPENDIX B1: Questionnaires, score cards and supporting documents  
 











Appendix B1.3: Letter of accordance from Archdiocese Caritas Prague 
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Appendix B1.4: Score cards for students in within-class comparison group  
 
 





Appendix C1: Average treatment effects 





















































































[n9 number of 
observations] 
 































































Appendix C1.2: Aggregated average treatment effects, by subject 
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Feedback provided (T) 
 



























































Within-class feedback             
(T1) 
Across-class feedback   
(T2) 
Financial Rewards   
(Finrew) 
Reputational Rewards   
(Reprew) 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 

















































































































































Note: OLS. The treatment effects are calculated with respect to the control group. Students in group “T” are those who received any type of feedback (either within-class 
feedback, T1, or across-class feedback, T2). Students in the group “Rew” received any type of reward (either financial reward, Finrew, or reputational reward, Reprew). 
Columns (1) – (6) represent the treatment effects in Math, columns (7) – (12) in English. In all specifications I controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level of study and 
school performance in national examination). N stands for the number of observations. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at school level are in parentheses.   












Appendix C1.3: Aggregated average treatment effects of the provision of feedback or rewards on Math score at different points in time 
 
 














































Within-class social comparison (T1) 
 
Across-class social comparison (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards  
 
Reputational Rewards  
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 










































































































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. The treatment effects are calculated with respect to the control group. 
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) control for stratum fixed effects (areas (by distance from the capital city, Kampala), school performance at national examination and grade 
level; P6,P7, S1 up to S4). N stands for the number of observations. The first two columns analyze the effect in testing round 4 and the baseline testing in round 1. The 
remaining estimates are based on the differences between round 5 (the final testing round) and the baseline round 1.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 












Appendix C1.4: Aggregated average treatment effects of the provision of feedback or rewards on English score at different points in time 
 
 




































OVERALL TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
Within-class social comparison  
     (T1) 
Across-class social comparison   
     (T2) 
Financial Rewards  
 
Reputational Rewards  
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Interactions 
Prob > F 

















































































































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. The treatment effects are calculated with respect to the control group. 
Columns (2), (4), (6) and (8) control for stratum fixed effects (areas (by distance from the capital city, Kampala), school performance at national examination and grade 
level; P6,P7, S1 up to S4). N stands for the number of observations. The first two columns analyze the effect in testing round 4 and the baseline testing in round 1. The 
remaining estimates are based on the differences between round 5 (the final testing round) and the baseline round 1.    * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 













(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Within-class feedback,  
     no feedback (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback,  
     no feedback (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards,  
     no feedback (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards,  
     no feedback (Rep_solo) 
Within-class feedback,  
     monetary reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback,  
     monetary reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback,  
     reputat.reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback,  
     reputat.reward (T2_rep) 










Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 



































































































































































































































































































Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Public equals 1 if the school is public school, 0 otherwise. Food equals 1 if student received food a day 
before, 0 otherwise. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations)  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Overall Performance (Math and English pooled) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 
Aggregated Feedback  
     (T) 
Aggregated Rewards  
     (REW) 
 
Within-class feedback   
     (T1)  
Across-class feedback     
     (T2) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Finrew)  
Reputational Rewards  






Change in Stress 
 
Change in Happiness 
 
Controlled for strata 
Prob > F 





































































































































































































































































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Students in group “T” are those who received any type of feedback (either 
within-class feedback, T1, or across-class feedback, T2). Students in the group “Rew” received any type of reward (financial reward, Finrew, or reputational reward, 
Reprew). Stress (Happiness) measures baseline level of students’ stress (happiness). Change in stress (happiness) measures change in stress (happiness level) between 
endline and baseline testing. The treatment effects are calculated with respect to the control group. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school 
performance in national examinations). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Note: Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Stress (Happiness) measures baseline level of students’ stress (happiness). Change 
in stress (happiness) measures change in stress (happiness level) between endline and baseline testing. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school 




Overall Performance (Math and English pooled) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Within-class feedback, no feedback  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no feedback  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards, no feedback  
     (Rep_solo) 
Within-class feedback, monetary reward  
     (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, monetary reward  
     (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, reputat.reward  
     (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, reputat.reward  





Change in stress 
 
Change in happiness 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 









































































































































Appendix C1.8: Aggregated average treatment effects of the provision of feedback or rewards on 






















Aggregated within-class social  
     comparison (T1) 
Aggregated across-class social  
     comparison (T2) 
Aggregated financial rewards  
     (Finrew) 
Aggregated Reputational    
     rewards (Reprew)  
 
Control for strata 
Prob > F 




























       0.061 
(0.043) 
       0.069 
(0.046) 
    0.176*** 
(0.062) 







       0.019 
(0.034) 
       0.019 
(0.039) 
    0.159*** 
(0.051) 






Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. The treatment effects are 
calculated with respect to the control group. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in 
national examinations) * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Differences of the 




Scenario 1 (Round 2 






























rewards 0.016 0.019 
Reputational 
Rewards 0.101 0.144 
 
 
Differences of the 




Scenario 2 (Round 3 






























rewards 0.054 0.064 
Reputational 




Differences of the 




Scenario 1 (Round 2 




























Rewards 0.039 0.056 
 
Differences of the 




Scenario 2 (Round 3 






























Rewards 0.196 0.244 
 
Note:  
Scenario 1:      
𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_2 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴1 +  𝛼2𝐴2 +  𝛼3𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_1 + 𝛼𝑑𝑋𝑑 + 𝜀 
Scenario 2: 
𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_3 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴1 +  𝛽2𝐴2 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_1 + 𝛽𝑑𝑋𝑑 + 𝜏 
Scenario 3:     
𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_5
= 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝐴1 + 𝛾2𝐴2 + 𝛾3𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑅𝑃𝐹 + 𝛾4𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐹 + 𝛾5𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_1 + 𝛾𝑑𝑋𝑑
+ 𝜇 
Scenario 4:     
𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_5
= 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝐴1 + 𝛿2𝐴2 +  𝛿3𝐹𝐹𝑛𝑅𝑃𝐹 + 𝛿4𝑅𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑃𝐹 + 𝛿5𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑆𝑅𝐹𝑅_4 + 𝛿𝑑𝑋𝑑
+ 𝜗 
 
where T1 stands for within-class feedback group (=1 if treated), T2 for across-class feedback group, 
FinRew for financially rewarded treatment group, RepRew for reputationally rewarded group, and  
X is a vector of stratification variables (school area, performance in the national examination and 
class level); p-values come from testing differences between estimated coefficients from 
regressions in various scenarios.   
93 














Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. The treatment effects are 
calculated with respect to the control group. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in 
national examinations). Initial stress level stands for the stress level in baseline testing. Change in stress stands for change 













Dependent variable:  
 
Sample: 









Within-class feedback  
 
Across-class feedback  
 
Financial rewards  
 
Reputation rewards  
 
Initial stress level 
 
Change in stress  
 
 
Controlled for strata 
Prob > F 
R-squared 
Number of observation 
      0.061 
     (0.043) 
      0.069 
     (0.046) 
    0.176*** 
(0.062) 













































      0.065 
(0.044) 
      0.062 
     (0.045) 
    0.194*** 
 (0.063) 












Appendix C1.9b: Sensitivity analysis 
 

















Within-class competition  
 
Across-class competition  
 
Financial rewards  
 
Reputation rewards  
 
Initial performance level 
 
Change in performance 
 
 
Controlled for strata 
Number of observation  
R-squared 











































     -0.180*** 












   0.578** 














































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. The treatment effects are 
calculated with respect to the control group. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in 
national examinations). Initial performance stands for pooled score from Math and English in the baseline testing. Change 
in performance stands for difference in scores between endline and baseline testing. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 


























Appendix C1.9c: Sensitivity analysis 
 

















Within-class competition  
 
Across-class competition  
 
Financial rewards  
 
Reputation rewards  
 
Initial performance level 
 
Change in performance  
 
 
Controlled for strata 
Number of observation  
R-squared 
Prob > F 
  0.428* 


















































   0.458** 
(0.222) 

















































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. The treatment effects are 
calculated with respect to the control group. Initial performance stands for pooled score from Math and English in the 
baseline testing. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). 
Change in performance stands for difference in scores between endline and baseline testing. * significant at 10%; ** 






















Appendix C1.10: Aggregated average treatment effects of the provision of feedback and rewards on 
the overall performance and students’ subjective well-being 
 
 
Dependent variable: STUDENTS’ OVERALL PERFORMANCE STRESS HAPPINESS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
Aggregated feedback treatment  
    pooled 
Aggregated reward treatment    






























Within-class social comparison,  
    aggregated 
Across-class social comparison,  
    aggregated  
Financial Rewards,  
    aggregated 
Reputational Rewards, 
    aggregated 
 




Area 2 (Kampala-Jinja road) 
 
Area 3 (Buikwe area) 
 
Area 4 (the most remote area 























   0.841*** 
(0.015) 
   0.109*** 
(0.039) 
   0.254*** 
(0.049) 
   0.447*** 
(0.041) 
   0.304*** 
(0.042) 
  -0.049 
(0.059) 




















  0.837*** 
(0.015) 
  0.104*** 
(0.038) 
  0.195*** 
(0.062) 
  0.368*** 
(0.059) 
























  0.841*** 
(0.015) 
  0.109*** 
(0.039) 
  0.254*** 
(0.049) 
  0.447*** 
(0.042) 















     0.061 
    (0.043) 
     0.069 
    (0.046) 
  0.176*** 
    (0.062) 
     0.102** 
    (0.051) 
 
  0.836*** 
(0.014) 
  0.099*** 
(0.038) 
  0.189*** 
(0.054) 
  0.325*** 
(0.059) 
































































   0.228*** 
(0.081) 
    0.208*** 
(0.071) 











Note: OLS. Pooled aggregated feedback treatment effect consists of the aggregated treatment effects of within- and across-
class feedbacks. Pooled aggregated reward treatment effect consists of the aggregated treatment effect of financial and 
reputational rewards. Columns (1) – (4) show the aggregated average treatment effects (ATE) of differently aggregated 
treatments on students’ overall performance. Columns (5) and (6) represent the average treatment effects on students’ 
well-being (stress and happiness respectively). Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in 
national examinations). * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1%. 
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Appendix D1: Gender differences 
Appendix D1.1: Average treatment effects on students’ performance and well-being, by gender 
 
Dependent variable: Mathematics English Sum 
Within-class feedback, no feedback  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no feedback  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards, no feedback  
     (Rep_solo) 
Within-class feedback, monetary reward    
     (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, monetary reward  
      (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, reputational    
      reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, reputational  




Within-class feedback, no feedback x   
      gender  (T1_solo x  gender) 
Across-class feedback, no feedback x   
      gender (T2_solo x  gender) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback x  gender  
      (Fin_solo x  gender) 
Reputational Rewards, no feedback x   
      gender (Rep_solo x  gender) 
Within-class feedback, monetary reward  
      x  gender (T1_fin x  gender) 
Across-class feedback, monetary reward  
      x  gender (T2_fin x  gender) 
Within-class feedback, reputational  
      reward x  gender (T1_rep x  gender) 
Across-class feedback, reputational  




Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 
























   -0.172** 
(0.086) 


























   0.237** 






































   0.235** 
  (0.104)     































Note: OLS. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four areas, school performance at national examination and grade level).  
Robust standard errors clustered at class level are in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
98 
   




OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY GIRLS OVERALL PERFORMANCE BY BOYS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Feedback provided (T) 
 
Rewards provided (Rew) 
 
 
Within-class feedback   
     (T1)  
Across-class feedback  
     (T2) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Finrew)  
Reputational Rewards   
     (Reprew)  
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 
Number of observation 
 









































  0.098** 
 (0.058) 





























          






















  0.089** 
(0.044) 



















































































  0.013 
 (0.047) 

































Note: OLS. Students in group “T” are those who received any type of feedback (either within-class feedback, T1, or across-class feedback, T2). Students in the group 
“Rew” received any type of reward (either financial reward, Finrew, or reputational reward, Reprew). Columns (1) – (6) represent the treatment effects on performance 
of girls, columns (7) – (12) on boys’ performance. In all specifications I controlled for stratas (i.e., students’ performance in the national examinations, area and the level 









   
Appendix D1.3: Girls’ aggregated average treatment effects on performance in Math and English 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Feedback provided (T) 
 
Rewards provided (Rew) 
 
 
Within-class feedback   
     (T1)  
Across-class feedback  
     (T2) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Finrew)  
Reputational Rewards   
     (Reprew)  
 
Controlled for stratas 
 
























































































































































































   0.094* 


























    0.099* 





Note: OLS. Students in group “T” are those who received any type of feedback (either within-class feedback, T1, or across-class feedback, T2). Students in the group 
“Rew” received any type of reward (financial reward, Finrew, or reputational reward, Reprew). Columns (1) – (6) represent the treatment effects in Math, columns (7) – 
(12) in English. In all specifications I controlled for stratas (i.e., students’ performance at the national examinations, area and the level of studies). Robust standard errors 








   
Appendix D1.4: Boys’ aggregated average treatment effects on performance in Math and English  
 




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Feedback provided (T) 
 
Rewards provided (Rew) 
 
Within-class feedback   
     (T1)  
Across-class feedback  
     (T2) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Finrew)  
Reputational Rewards   
     (Reprew)  
 
Controlled for stratas 
 



























































































  0.038 
(0.071) 
  0.003 
(0.065) 
  0.207** 
(0.089) 












































































































Note: Rows represent aggregated treatment groups. Students in group “T” are those who received any type of feedback (either within-class feedback (T1) or across-class 
feedback (T2)). Students in the group “Rew” received any type of reward (financial reward (Finrew) or reputational reward (Reprew)). Columns (1) – (6) represent the 
treatment effects in Math, columns (7) – (12) in English. In all specifications I controlled for stratas (i.e., students’ performance at the national examinations, area and the 














   






PERCEIVED STRESS PERCEIVED HAPPINESS 
OVERALL GIRLS BOYS OVERALL GIRLS BOYS 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
Feedback provided (T) 
 
Rewards provided (Rew) 
 
 
Within-class feedback   
     (T1)  
Across-class feedback  
     (T2) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Finrew)  
Reputational Rewards   
     (Reprew)  
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F  




   0.516* 




















































































































































































































Note: Rows represent aggregated treatment groups. Students in group “T” are those who received any type of feedback (either within-class feedback, T1, or across-class 
feedback, T2). Students in the group “Rew” received any type of reward (financial reward, Finrew, or reputational reward, Reprew). Columns (1) – (6) represent the 
treatment effects on perceived stress, columns (7) – (12) on perceived happiness. In all specifications I controlled for stratas (i.e., students’ performance at the national 
examinations, area and the level of studies). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at school level are in parentheses.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; 




   
Appendix D1.6: Average treatment effects on students’ performance and well-being, by gender 
 
















Confidence (English)  
 
Aspirations  
Education over work 
 
Education over rest 
 












































  0.258** 
(0.116) 






























   -0.267** 
(0.110) 






















































Confidence (English)  
 
Aspirations  
Education over work 
 
Education over rest 
 




















































































































Note: OLS. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four areas, school performance at national examination and grade level). 
Robust standard errors clustered at class level are in brackets. Prob > F = 0.0000. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
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Appendix D1.7: Average treatment effects on students’ performance and well-being, by gender 
 
Treatment group: Only financial rewards Within-class feedback rewarded financially 
Across-class feedback 
rewarded financially 











Confidence (English)  
 
Aspirations  
Education over work 
 
Education over rest 
 

























  0.482*** 
(0.162) 









































































































Confidence (English)  
 
Aspirations  
Education over work 
 
Education over rest 
 




















































































































Note: OLS. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four areas, school performance at national examination and grade level).  
Robust standard errors clustered at class level are in brackets. Prob > F = 0.0000. * significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
104 
   
Appendix E1: Group composition  
Appendix E1.1: Comparison of average treatment effects on performance, exerted effort and 
subjective well-being, by group ability composition 
 
Note: OLS. Mixed ability groups consist of students who performed below and above median in baseline testing. Well-
performing (poor-performers) groups consist only of students who performed above (below) median. Only groups of 
three students are taken into account.  Poor-performing groups serve as comparison group in this exercise. Robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering at school level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratification variables (area, 













Dependent variable: Math English Perceived Stress 
Subjective 




Mixed ability: only  
     feedback 
High-ability:  only 
     feedback 
 
Mixed ability: feedback  
     and monetary reward 
High-ability: feedback  
     and monetary reward 
 
Mixed ability: feedback  
    and reputational reward 
High-ability: feedback  










Prob > F 
Number of observation 
 
     0.055 
(0.059) 
    0.451*** 
(0.129) 
 
  0.275** 
(0.127) 
    0.561*** 
(0.206) 
 
    0.262*** 
(0.092) 
    0.322** 
(0.149)  
     
    0.271*** 
(0.079) 
  0.253** 
(0.123) 







   0.133** 
 (0.063) 
     0.387*** 
 (0.078) 
 
    0.521*** 
(0.086) 
    0.449*** 
(0.099) 
 
    0.357*** 
(0.078) 



















    0.313** 


































































































   
Appendix E1.2: Comparison of average treatment effects on performance, exerted effort and 
subjective well-being, by group gender composition 
 
 
Note: OLS. Three boys stands for groups consisting only of boys. Two boys + One girl stands (One boy + Two girls) for 
groups consisting of two (one) boys and one (two) girl. Only groups of three students are taken into account.  Groups 
consisting of only girls serve as the comparison group in this exercise. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at 
school level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national 












Three boys: only feedback 
 
Two boys + One girl:  
      only feedback 
One boy + Two girls:  
      only feedback  
 
Three boys: feedback and  
     monetary reward 
Two boys + 1 girl: feedback and  
     monetary reward 
One boy + 2 girls: feedback and  
     monetary reward 
 
Three boys: feedback and  
     reputational reward 
Two boys + 1 girl: feedback and  
     reputational reward 
One boy + 2 girls: feedback and  










Prob > F 


































































































































































































   
Appendix F1: Other  
Appendix F1.1: Aggregated average treatment effects, OLS versus other specifications, by subject 
 
Specification: 







MATH   
 
Within-class feedback (T1) 
 
Across-class feedback (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards (Finrew) 
 
Reputational Rewards  
     (Reprew) 
Baseline Mathematic score 
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
















































  0.169** 
(0.079) 
  0.157** 
(0.067) 





















Within-class feedback (T1) 
 
Across-class feedback (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards (Finrew) 
 
Reputational Rewards  
     (Reprew) 
Baseline English score 
 
 
Controlled for stratas 




















    0.290*** 
(0.083) 
  0.155** 
(0.068) 










   0.159* 
  (0.075) 
0.103 
(0.073) 










      0.211*** 
  (0.066) 
      0.158*** 
  (0.056) 




















Note: Various specifications. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled 
for stratum fixed effects (four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national 
examination and grade level (P6,P7, S1 up to S4). IPW stands for the inverse probability weight regression adjusting for 
students’ probability of dropping out. The imputations based on median ratio imputed the last available observation in 
Math or English adjusted for the difference in the test difficulties using median ratio. In the imputations based on class 
percentiles I first seek for the percentile rank of the student in his last observed score within his class and then assign the 
student grade from the testing round 5 of a student from the same percentile rank.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 





   














NON-INTERACTED TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
Within-class feedback, no  
     feedback (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no  
     feedback (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no  
     feedback (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards, no  
















































TREATMENT INTERACTIONS  
 
Within-class feedback,  
     monetary reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback,  
     monetary reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback,  
     reputational reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback,  
     reputational reward (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline Math score 
 
 
Controlled for stratas 













































































Note: Various specifications. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled 
for stratum fixed effects (four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national 
examination and grade level (P6,P7, S1 up to S4). IPW stands for the inverse probability weight regression adjusting for 
students’ probability to dropout. The imputations based on median ratio imputed the last available observation in Math 
or English adjusted for the difference in the test difficulties using median ratio. In the imputations based on class 
percentiles I first seek for the percentile rank of the student in his last observed score within his class and then assign the 
student grade from the testing round 5 of a student from the same percentile rank.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 









   














NON-INTERACTED TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
Within-class feedback, no 
feedback (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no 
feedback (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback 
(Fin_solo) 


















































TREATMENT INTERACTIONS   
 
Within-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline Math score 
 
 
Controlled for stratas 

















  0.145* 
 (0.086) 













































    0.175** 












Note: Various specifications. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled 
for stratum fixed effects (four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national 
examination and grade level (P6,P7, S1 up to S4). IPW stands for the inverse probability weight regression adjusting for 
students’ probability to dropout. The imputations based on median ratio imputed the last available observation in Math 
or English adjusted for the difference in the test difficulties using median ratio. In the imputations based on class 
percentiles I first seek for the percentile rank of the student in his last observed score within his class and then assign the 
student grade from the testing round 5 of a student from the same percentile rank.   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%   








   














Within-class feedback (T1) 
 
Across-class feedback (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards (Finrew) 
 
Reputational Rewards (Reprew) 
 
Baseline Mathematic score 
 
 
































  0.175** 
(0.083) 
  0.124** 
(0.062) 











  0.125* 
(0.075) 






Within-class feedback (T1) 
 
Across-class feedback (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards (Finrew) 
 
Reputational Rewards (Reprew) 
 
Baseline English score 
 
 






    0.158** 
  (0.053) 
   0.108** 
  (0.053) 









    0.181** 
  (0.071) 
   0.099* 
  (0.058) 
       0.746*** 












     0.758*** 








     0.160** 
  (0.065) 
   0.105* 
   (0.058) 
       0.764*** 




Note: OLS and quartile regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. 
Controlled for stratum fixed effects (four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national 














   















NON-INTERACTED TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
Within-class feedback, no 
feedback (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no 
feedback (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback 
(Fin_solo) 







































TREATMENT INTERACTIONS   
 
Within-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline English score 
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
 
  0.231* 
(0.118) 
  0.277** 
(0.139) 
  0.209** 
(0.103) 
  0.188** 
(0.080) 
 











  0.163* 
(0.096) 
 









  0.214** 
(0.100) 
    0.193*** 
(0.075) 
 



















Note: OLS and quartile regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. 
Controlled for stratum fixed effects - four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national 













   
















NON-INTERACTED TREATMENT EFFECTS 
 
Within-class feedback, no 
feedback (T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no 
feedback (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback 
(Fin_solo) 









































TREATMENT INTERACTIONS   
 
Within-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline English score 
 
 


















    0.209** 

























  0.169* 
   (0.089) 
0.099 
  (0.078) 
0.060 
  (0.087) 
0.040 
  (0.077) 
 





Note: OLS and quartile regressions. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. 
Controlled for stratum fixed effects - four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national 
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(0.075) 
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 (0.093) 
DISAGGREGATED ATE     
NON-INTERACTED TREATMENT 
EFFECTS  
Within-class feedback, no feedback 
(T1_solo) 
Across-class feedback, no feedback 
(T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards, no feedback 
(Fin_solo) 




Within-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback, monetary 
reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback, 
reputational reward (T2_rep) 
 
Initial Math/English score 
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F 















    -0.372*** 
(0.096) 
  -0.178** 
(0.086) 


























































































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed 
effects (four areas by distance from the capital city, Kampala, school performance at national examination and grade level 





Appendix F1.7a: Comparison of uncorrected and corrected p-values using different multiple-comparison procedures: for aggregated and 
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Appendix F1.7b: Comparison of uncorrected and corrected p-values using different multiple-comparison procedures: for aggregated and 
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Appendix F1.7c: Comparison of uncorrected and corrected p-values using different multiple-comparison procedures: for aggregated and 
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2 Information Provision and Overconfidence: Evidence 
from a Randomized Control Trial in Schools 
 
 
“No problem in judgment and decision making is more prevalent and more potentially 





People often believe they are better than average. Overconfidence34 is an important 
behavioral bias observed in different domains35 and may have economic consequences36. 
An important question, therefore, is how to lower student inaccuracy in self-assessment. 
Provision of feedback regarding one’s performance lowers the confidence gap (e.g., Ryvkin 
et al., 2012) but people remain overconfident (e.g., Lipko et al., 2009). A possible 
explanation is that people have insufficient information about others.  
Unlike other studies largely using university students in developed countries as 
their samples, I bring evidence from a large field experiment conducted with more than 
5,000 primary and secondary school students repeatedly tested and interviewed in a 
                                                 
 
34 What I mean by overconfidence is, according to the definition by Moore and Healy (2008), overestimation 
of one’s own ability or performance.  
35 Ranging from university professors (Cross, 1977), students (Clayson, 2005), engineers (Zenger, 1992), to 
drivers (Marottoli and Richardson, 1998), etc.  
36 Such as in Levy (1983), Howard (1983), Odean (1998), Camerer and Lovallo (1999), Kennedy et al. (2002), 
Moore and Kim, (2003), Clayson (2005), etc. For details see the literature review section. 
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developing country, Uganda. Students were randomly assigned to a control group and two 
treatment groups. Students in the within-class feedback group were randomly divided into 
groups of three to four classmates and received feedback about their own performance and 
the performance of their group within their respective classes. Students in the across-class 
feedback group were evaluated as a class and received feedback about their own 
performance and the performance of their class compared to other classes in the district. 
Students were tested and interviewed five times over one academic year and received 
feedback repeatedly.  
The first contribution of this research is that I test whether the provision of 
feedback about their own performance, the performance of group members and the 
relative position of the group leads to a decrease in excessive overconfidence.  
Second, a randomized experiment with five repeated measures of student 
performance and their performance expectations represents a unique opportunity to bring 
new evidence to the debate regarding the existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect, the 
existence of which has been questioned. Kruger and Dunning (1999) first documented a 
systematic pattern in overconfidence: unskilled students tend to strongly overestimate 
their performance and the skilled students to weakly underestimate their performance. 
Krueger and Mueller (2002) attribute the pattern to the regression-to-the-mean combined 
with better-than-average effect. The main argument is that a fraction of students appear in 
the bottom/top performance quartile by chance and their performance will regress 
towards the mean in subsequent testing. Random allocation of students into comparison 
and treatment groups (a method used in this experiment) results in both groups being 
equally influenced by regression-to-the-mean (Barnett, van der Pols and Dobson, 2005). In 
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the current experiment repeated measures of student performance help to distinguish 
between students who remain in the bottom performance quartile during the entire 
duration of the experiment (“non-switchers”) and students who improve and as a result 
depart from the original bottom performance quartile (“switchers”). 
The results confirm that students are overconfident and the overconfidence persists 
over time. The pattern is similar in Math and English separately. One may expect that being 
exposed to a task repeatedly should help students adjust their expectations. The evidence 
from this experiment, however, suggests the opposite. Based on the expected performance 
of the control group, in the final testing round students miscalibration increased by 69.1% 
(86.6% in Math and 52.9% in English). The provision of feedback lowers the degree of 
miscalibration but the confidence gap remains persistent.  
Students react to feedback provision immediately, with the student confidence gap 
decreasing by 12.5% right after they received feedback compared to the students in the 
control group. Students significantly improved in their estimations in response to the first 
two subsequent feedbacks. Afterwards their confidence level did not improve significantly. 
The type of feedback does not play a significant role. Girls improve in their estimations 
more compared to boys. Students in secondary schools improve more compared to 
primary school students, which is most likely caused by greater selectivity into secondary 
schools (age does not play a significant role in calibration). The miscalibration of results in 
English is lower than the prediction of inaccuracy in Math. A possible explanation is that 
control-group students did not improve in Math during the entire academic year whereas 
they improved in English by more than 50%. This finding suggests that as students’ skills in 
English become stronger they recognize the extent of their mistakes and therefore become 
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more precise in their evaluations, which is in line with the results of Kruger and Dunning 
(1999). 
The results confirm the presence of the Dunning-Kruger effect on the tasks that 
students perceive as more difficult than tasks to which they are usually exposed. On easier 
tasks or tasks of comparable difficulty, all students overestimated their performance, with 
bottom performers being even more inaccurate compared to the top performers. 
Regression-to-the-mean emphasized mainly by Krueger and Mueller (2002) does not seem 
to play a significant role. Other predictions by Kruger and Dunning (1999) are discussed in 
the Results Section.  
The chapter is organized as follows. In section 2.2 I first review the existing 
literature. In section 2.3 I describe the final sample. In section 2.4, I discuss overconfidence 
among students and I present the evidence for and against the predictions of Kruger and 
Dunning (1999). In section 2.5, I discuss the average treatment effects of different 
incentives on student overconfidence. In section 2.6 I discuss the heterogeneity of the 
results. Finally, in section 2.7 I conclude.   
2.2 Literature Review 
People have been found overconfident in many domains. Cross (1977) reports that 
94% of college professors considered their performances to be above average and more 
than two-thirds thought they performed in the top quartile. Bottom quartile students (in 
terms of performance) evaluated their score to be in the 60th percentile (Kruger and 
Dunning, 1999). 42% of engineers estimated their performance to be within the top 5% 
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among all colleagues (Zenger, 1992). All active drivers older than 77 years who 
participated in a study by Marottoli and Richardson (1998) ranked themselves as average 
or above average in their driving skills compared to other drivers of the same age. 
Similarly, 90% of drivers in Svenson’s (1981) study believed they possessed above average 
driving ability; etc. 
2.2.1  The Dunning-Kruger Effect 
Subjects who are particularly overconfident typically come from the bottom 
performance quartile, whereas subjects from the top performance quartile have a tendency 
to underestimate their performance. Kruger and Dunning (1999) were the first to describe 
asymmetries in evaluations of self-assessment known as the Dunning-Kruger effect or the 
“unskilled-and-unaware” phenomenon. Since then the topic has been vividly discussed in 
the literature37. The authors argue that incompetent students face a “dual burden: not only 
do these people reach erroneous conclusions and make unfortunate choices, but their 
incompetence robs them of the metacognitive ability to realize it” (p.1121). Skilled 
subjects, on the other hand have a tendency to underestimate their performance. The 
authors suggest that the skilled face the “false-consensus effect:” since they perform well, 
they expect others to perform in a similar way. The skilled fail to identify their strengths. 
The study was replicated several times in different domains showing similar results (e.g., 
Dunning et al., 2003; Ehrlinger et al., 2008, etc.).  
                                                 
 
37 The unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon has been confirmed to arise among medical laboratory 
technicians (Haun et al., 2000), medical students (Hodges et al., 2001), undergraduate students (Dunning et 
al., 2003), students applying for graduate studies (Ryvkin et al., 2012), clerks (Edwards et al., 2003), etc.  
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A different interpretation of the empirical findings was offered by Krueger and 
Mueller (2002)38 who attributed the pattern, instead, to the existence of “regression-to-the-
mean” in combination with the “better-than-average” phenomenon (people generally 
overestimate their performance).  Regression-to-the-mean means that it is unlikely that all 
students who are in the lowest (highest) performance group will once again be in the 
lowest (highest) performance group in subsequent testing, because some fraction of them 
happened to perform poorly (well) by pure “bad luck”.  As a result, their performance and 
predictions of their own performance will be inflated or deflated toward the mean.  
Regression-to-the-mean arises in situations where the variables are imperfectly 
correlated. If it is not taken into consideration, it may be attributed incorrectly to the 
overall treatment effect of an intervention. Burson et al. (2006) agree with Krueger and 
Mueller (2002) that all students face difficulty with accurate self-assessment but they 
attribute the existence of the pattern to task difficulty. They manipulate the levels of 
difficulties of the tasks in their sessions and find that poor performers had a tendency to 
overestimate their performance only in tasks that they perceived as easy, whereas in 
difficult tasks this pattern disappeared. Moore and Cain (2008) go one step further and 
examine the relationship between task difficulty and the nature of the task. The authors 
find evidence that people are inaccurate about their performance on difficult tasks that are 
skill-based (as opposed to tasks whose success is based on chance). They attribute people’s 
inflated beliefs to the fact that, on skill-based tasks, people simply have better information 
                                                 
 
38 See also Ackerman et al. (2002), Kruger and Funder (2004), Burson et al. (2006), etc. 
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about their own preferences than about others’ preferences which leads to regressive 
beliefs about others.  
Ehrlinger et al. (2008) attempt to answer whether the Dunning-Kruger effect is a 
psychological phenomenon or a statistical artifact. In five experiments the authors ask 
students to predict their absolute and relative positions in various environments: with and 
without competition; in the lab as well as in the field; in an academic environment with 
undergraduate students and participants recruited at a Trap and Skeet (shooting) 
competition, or with and without financial incentives for accuracy of subjects’ predictions. 
The authors use counterfactual regression analysis (Winship and Morgan, 1999) to discuss 
the presence of regression-to-the-mean. Overall, they do not find supportive evidence for 
the arguments of Krueger and Mueller (2002) and Burson et al. (2006). Their results 
instead support the original paper by Kruger and Dunning (1999), though not to the full 
extent.  
Research presented here aims to contribute to the debate about the existence of the 
unskilled-and-unaware phenomenon but it differs in various domains. It contributes to the 
literature by bringing evidence from a randomized control trial with five repeated 
measures of student performance. It means that, as opposed to a statistically created 
counterfactual by Ehrlinger et al. (2008), part of my sample was randomly put into a 
control group. The performance of the control group mimics “what if” scenarios. Random 
allocation of students results in all groups being equally influenced by regression-to-the-
mean (Barnett, van der Pols and Dobson, 2005). Repeated measures of student 
performance allow me to compare the behavior of students who remained in the bottom 
performance quartile during the entire duration of the experiment with students who 
123 
 
improved and as a result, departed from the original bottom performance quartile. 
Furthermore, it was implemented with primary and secondary school students in a 
developing country as opposed to the common use of undergraduate students in developed 
countries. 
2.2.2 How to Improve Self-Assessments? 
Miscalibrations in assessment of one’s own performance may be costly. It has been 
shown that overconfidence may have economic consequences. It has played a role in stock 
market bubbles (Odean, 1998), entrepreneur failures (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), 
suboptimal predictions in marketing management (Mahajan, 1992) and even in wars and 
strikes (Levy, 1983; Howard, 1983). Students are no exception (Kennedy et al., 2002; 
Clayson, 2005, etc.)39. Inflated beliefs regarding their own performance may lead students 
to exert suboptimal levels of effort and result in worse performance. Overconfident 
subjects seem to engage at a higher rate in competition (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Moore 
and Kim, 2003) and are less likely to take advice from others (Gino and Moore, 2007). 
Dunlosky and Rawson (2012) show that overconfidence may lead to underperformance in 
students. Therefore, it is important to understand who the students with the most 
inaccurate self-assessments are and how we can improve the level of their own assessment 
calibration.  
                                                 
 
39 An exception is research conducted by Azmat et al. (2015). The authors studied the effects of rank 
performance feedback on university student academic performance and they found most of the students 
were underconfident.  
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If people persistently overestimate their performance, what could be done to help 
them improve their accuracy? Moore and Cain (2008) suggest that “myopic interpersonal 
comparisons” may be most effectively eliminated if the subjects receive sufficient 
information about the performance of others (p.207)40. Burson et al. (2006) also see the 
lack of understanding of how well their peers do in a given task as an explanation for 
students’ inaccurate predictions. The provision of feedback helps to improve judgements 
and decision making (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000; Duffy and Hopkins, 2005; Krajč, 2008; 
Ryvkin et al., 2012; Moore and Cain, 2007; Miller and Geraci, 2011; Hacker et al., 2008)41.  
Although subjects who receive absolute and/or relative feedback about their own 
performance and/or performance of others typically improve their self-assessments, they 
remain overconfident. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) offer a possible explanation - people 
inflate their beliefs about their own performance because they neglect information about 
others and focus on their own performance only. The authors studied the connection 
between overconfidence and “entry into competitive games and markets”. They were 
particularly interested in testing the hypothesis that manager overconfidence could be 
responsible for business failures. They specified a new competition-specific mechanism – 
“reference group neglect42 [which] predicts that when agents compete based on skill, they 
                                                 
 
40 It is typical that people identify themselves with groups and derive utility from the image of the group 
(Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990, Aberson et al., 2000; Hewstone et al., 2002). 
41 Krajc (2008) and Ryvkin et al. (2012) studied the effect of feedback on calibration among applicants for 
graduate studies. Students received feedback about their own performance and were monetarily incentivized 
for the precision of the estimates of their performance. Feedback lowered miscalibration of self-assessment. 
Hacker et al. (2000) provided undergraduate students with repeated feedback regarding their own 
performance in three exams during a semester-length course. Only well performing students calibrated their 
self-assessments and became more accurate. Poorly performing students did not improve. Further studies 
with relative feedback see Ehrlinger et al., 2008; Moore and Cain, 2008. 
42 Known in the literature also as egocentrism – e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), Moore and Kim (2003), 
Windschitl et al. (2003). 
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will be insufficiently sensitive to the quality of competition” (p.315-316). Accordingly, 
people may not incorporate sufficiently the qualities of their opponents and therefore 
inaccurately evaluate their own performance relative to others. In existing studies, the 
ranking of an individual typically depends solely on his/her own performance. In 
particular, it does not depend on the performance of others. Would group-dependence in 
performance eliminate reference group neglect and help to decrease students’ inaccuracy 
of their self-assessments? In the current study, students are evaluated in groups and the 
ranking is therefore based on the performance of all group members43. 
In summary, the current paper contributes to the literature by identifying whether 
being involved, evaluated and incentivized in a group environment with detailed feedback 
about one’s own performance and the performance of group members can influence one’s 
own confidence and in what ways. Moreover, it brings actual field evidence from primary 
and secondary schools in Southern Uganda to the debate on the unskilled-and-unaware 
phenomenon.  
2.3 Data and the Final Sample 
The final sample consists of 53 schools located in rural areas (31 primary and 22 
secondary schools) out of which 19 are public, 24 are private and 10 are community 
                                                 
 
43 Note that the design of this experiment differs from studies interested in the prevalence of inaccurate 
beliefs with respect to social groups (i.e., confidence in groups). Healy and Offenberg (2007) and Healy and 
Pate (2011) find in lab and field experiments respectively that “confidence in one’s group parallels confidence 
in oneself” (p.24). After decomposition of the results by gender, they find significant gender differences in 
attitudes towards groups. Females show greater confidence in their groups, whereas males in themselves. 
Cacault and Grieder (2016) find inflated confidence in the relative ability of a group a subject identifies with 
compared to the confidence in another group. In this study, I analyze the confidence in oneself while being 
evaluated in groups with repeated feedback about group performance. 
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schools. The sample comprised 146 classes from six grades (P6 and P7 in primary schools, 
S1 through S4 in secondary schools) containing a total of more than 5000 students who 
were repeatedly tested and out of whom 3513 students were present in all five testing 
rounds.  
The main outcome variables are student performance in Math and in English and 
their confidence gap. The confidence gap measures a student’s miscalibration of his/her 
own performance44 and is calculated as the difference between the expected number of 
points and the real performance. Students could achieve a maximum of 50 points in Math 
and 50 points in English, and they were reminded of this at every visit. The exams were 
constructed to be consistent with school curriculums and were conducted in addition to 
regular examinations. All the exam questions were taken from Primary/Secondary Leaving 
Examination questions published by the Ugandan National Examination Board.  
To predict their performance, students were asked the question, “How many points 
do you think you will truly obtain from the exam you have just completed/you are about to 
complete?” The question was asked separately for Math and for English. Students could 
circle only one out of 10 options (interval 1: “0 – 5 points”, interval 2: “6-10 points”, …, 
interval 10: “46-50 points”)45. A student is considered to be over-estimating his/her 
performance if his/her real score is below the minimum value of the point-interval 
(positive confidence gap); accurately calculating his/her performance if his/her real score 
is within the interval range he/she estimates (confidence gap around 0); or under-
                                                 
 
44  Based on the classification by Moore and Healy (2008) miscalibration of one’s own performance is called 
overestimation. 
45 I take the mid-point of each category in order to transmit the categories into points (i.e., 1: 3 points, 2: 8 
points, …, 10: 48 points). An alternative way is to use the average value within each interval. The results 
suggest similar findings.  
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estimating his/her performance if his/her real score is above the maximum value of the 
point interval (negative confidence gap).  
 
𝐹𝑛𝑖𝐹𝑖𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑃𝑠  �
𝑠𝑖𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑒𝐹𝑛𝑒          𝐹𝑃 𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑑 < 𝑃𝐹𝑛𝐹𝑗                     
𝐹𝑃𝑠𝑠 − 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝐹𝑐𝑃𝑃𝑒𝐹𝑛𝑒          𝐹𝑃 𝑃𝐹𝑛𝐹𝑗 ≤ 𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑑 ≤ 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝐹𝑗  
𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑃𝑃 − 𝑃𝑠𝑒𝐹𝑃𝑃𝑒𝐹𝑛𝑒       𝐹𝑃 𝑠𝑃𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑑 > 𝑃𝑃𝑚𝐹𝑗                   
 
  where Ij is student i’s choice of interval range, j=1, 2, …, 10.  
 
Overall, 1% of students did not answer the question regarding the estimation of 
their performance or they answered it incorrectly (they selected more than one option) 
and I excluded the observations from further analysis. I also excluded data from one 
secondary school that went bankrupt during the 2012 academic year and whose students 
were reallocated to different secondary schools.  
2.4 Results: Overconfidence and the Existence of the Unskilled-
and-Unaware Phenomenon 
 
First, I relate the findings from this experiment to the existing results on 
overconfidence and the existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect. The evaluation of the 




2.4.1 Overconfidence  
Most of the students (81%) of the sample were overconfident46, whereas 
approximately 11% of students estimated their performance correctly and 8% of students 
underestimated their performance. In the baseline survey, the average student thought 
he/she ranked in the 94th percentile while his/her actual overall score from combined 
Math and English was in the 57th percentile47. In other words, the average student 
overestimated his/her performance by 104.7%. A similar pattern can be found for each 
subject separately, by level of study (primary versus secondary schools) and by gender48 
(see Appendix B2.2 for the relationship between initial performance and initial confidence 
gap). 
One possible explanation is that students might face difficulty in estimating their 
performance in an activity that they have not performed before. Therefore, I looked at the 
confidence rates among the control-group students in the second testing round. I found 
that these students were even more overconfident, i.e., 95.1% overestimated their score, 
2.9% correctly estimated their score, and 2.1% underestimated it49. In other words, the 
average control-group student overestimated his/her overall performance by 144%.  
                                                 
 
46 Only 10 students scored higher than 40 points out of 50 in both, Math and English and only one student 
scored more than 45 points in Math (no one in English). Therefore, there is space for overconfidence for all 
students. See Appendices A2.1, A2.4 and A2.5 for comparison of students by the level of their confidence.  
47 Median student in terms of his/her performance expected to be ranked in 93rd percentile. For the analysis, 
I will follow common practice in the literature on overconfidence and provide comparisons for average 
students (in terms of their performance).  
48 In Math (English), the average student thought he/she scored in the 80th (the 84th percentile), while 
his/her actual score was in the 32nd (66th percentile). Students overestimated their performance on average 
by 99.1% in Math and by 57% in English. Similarly in the subsequent testing round the average student 
overestimated his/her performance in Math by 131% and 72% in English. 
49 A fraction of students received feedback in Round 2 before they revealed their expectations about their 
own performance. The results are similar for the overall sample in Round 2 as well as the restricted sample 
129 
 
Similarly, in the endline testing, 95.7% of control group students were 
overconfident and overestimated their performance by 131.5%. Thus, being exposed to a 
task repeatedly (i.e., repeated testing in the Math and English exam without feedback) does 
not seem to help students to close their confidence gaps (see Figures 2.1 and 2.2).  
 
Figure 2.1: Distribution of the gap between expected and real performance, by testing rounds  
 
Note: Confidence gap is the difference between expected and real performance. An underconfident student has a negative 
confidence gap (he/she expects a lower number of points compared to his/her real performance). A student with well-
calibrated expectations estimates approximately the same score as he/she receives and his/her gap is close to zero. An 
overconfident student expects a higher score compared to his/her real performance (and therefore his/her confidence 
gap is positive).    
 
It is not only that the fraction of overconfident control-group students increases 
over time but the average size of the confidence gap significantly increases by 54.2% in 
overall performance (79.4% in Math, and 16.4% in English, see also Figure 2.3)50. Being 
exposed to the provision of feedback decreases confidence bias, but overall students 
remain predominantly overconfident (see further discussion in section 2.5).  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
when only the control group (with no treatment) is taken into account. See Appendix A2.6 and A2.7 for more 
details.  




Figure 2.2: Fractions of students based on their confidence level, by testing round 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The change of the confidence gap in Math and English of bottom and top performing 




A similar pattern can be found for bottom- and top-performing students (see Figure 
2.4), in which the p-values show statistical difference between the two groups of students. 
In the baseline survey, both skilled and unskilled students from the control group 
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miscalibrated their performance, although unskilled students to a significantly greater 
extent). 
I used the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test (WSR) to test the significance 
in differences between the anticipated and actual performance of students. The null 
hypothesis of the test is that the observations come from the same distribution. The WSR 
test rejects the null hypothesis in all testing rounds (i.e., round 1 to round 5), in all cases at 
the 1% significance level. Students’ estimates of their own scores were inaccurate (see 
Appendix A2.3).  
 
Result 1: Students of primary and secondary schools are mostly overconfident and the 
overconfidence persists over time, even after repeated feedback.  
 
Figure 2.4: Comparison of the confidence gap of control-group students in the baseline and endline 
testing  
 
Note: FB stands for feedback.  
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2.4.2 The Unskilled-and-Unaware Phenomenon  
2.4.2.1 Bottom versus Top Performing Students and their Expectations  
Both top as well as bottom performing students overestimate their actual 
performance but the magnitude of miscalibration is significantly higher among bottom 
performers. The average gap between perceived and actual performance (in combined 
Math and English) is 10.9 points greater for the bottom performers compared to the top 
performers (see Figure 2.5). Bottom quartile students overestimated their actual 
performance by an extraordinary 277%, while top quartile students’ overestimation was 
only 41%. In other words, the bottom (top) performers predicted themselves to be in the 
87th (98th) percentile while they scored in the 11th (91st) percentile.  
 





These results for bottom performing students are similar to the results of Kruger 
and Dunning (1999). In their case students scored in the 10th to 12th percentile (depending 
on the task) but predicted themselves to rank in the 60th percentile. The results for top 
performers, however, differ: skilled students in the current study do not underestimate 
their performance but are significantly more accurate in their predictions. Similar results 
can be found in Burson et al. (2006) and Ehlinger et al. (2008).  
 
Result 2: Bottom-performing students grossly overestimate their performance.  
 
Result 3: Top-performing students do not underestimate their performance (as found by 
Kruger and Dunning, 1999) but overestimate significantly less compared to the unskilled 
ones.  
2.4.2.2 Behavioral Bias or Statistical Artefact?  
The main argument of regression-to-the-mean is that a fraction of students appears 
in the bottom or top performance quartile by chance and their performance will regress 
towards the mean in subsequent testing. I take advantage of the design of this randomized 
experiment with repeated measures of student performance and their confidence levels to 
contribute to the debate about whether the Kruger-Dunning effect is a behavioral bias or a 
statistical artefact.  
All groups (control or treatment groups) should be equally influenced by 
regression-to-the-mean (Barnett, van der Pols and Dobson, 2005) due to random 
assignment of students into groups. Repeated measures of student performance help 
distinguish between students who remained in the bottom performance quartile during the 
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entire duration of the experiment (“non-switchers”) from those who departed from the 
original bottom performance quartile (“switchers”). Comparison of the confidence gap (and 
its evolution) of the switchers and non-switchers should help us understand whether there 
is scope for regression to the mean. As shown in Figure 2.6, I compare the confidence gap of 
bottom and top performing students based on two selection criteria: 
 
Selection criterion 1 (non-switchers and switchers pooled): bottom or top performing 
students are those who scored in bottom or top quartile in baseline Math and English, 
regardless of their performance in subsequent rounds.  
Selection criterion 2 (non-switchers only): bottom or top performing students are those who 
scored in the bottom or top quartile in every test of Math and English.  
 
Figure 2.6: Evolution of the gap between expected and real performance, by two selection criteria of 
students into bottom or top performers’ groups and by treatment status  
 
Note: students selected into the bottom or top quartile according to criteria 1 include students who deviated from the 
bottom or top quartile in subsequent testing rounds; whereas these “switchers” are excluded from criteria 2. SC1/SC2 
stands for Selection Criteria 1/2. 
135 
 
Students who stayed in the bottom (or top) performance quartile during the whole 
academic year scored significantly worse compared to students who ranked in the bottom-
quartile in the baseline survey and then switched. In terms of the confidence gap the 
results are not that straightforward. The differences between control-group switchers and 
non-switchers in the confidence gaps are mainly insignificant in both subjects. Switchers 
and non-switchers react to feedback provision similarly with one exception: in Math 
switchers reduce their inaccurate estimates significantly more compared to non-switchers. 
Both groups of students seem to overestimate their performance in a similar way. The 
results do not seem to be driven by regression-to-the-mean (see Appendix A2.8).  
 
Result 4: Bottom performing students predict their performance in a similar way under the 
two scenarios – with or without “switchers” being included.  
 
2.5 Results: The Effects of Repeated Feedback Provision on Student 
Confidence 
 
We have seen that students do not improve their inaccurate estimations of their 
own performances by being exposed to a task repeatedly. On the other hand, do they 
improve if they receive complex feedback about their own performance, the performance 
of other group members and the position of the group?  
136 
 
2.5.1 Average Treatment Effects of Incentives on Student Confidence 
 
Table 2.1 provides a comparison of the size of the confidence gap in the baseline and 
endline testing divided by treatment and control groups. There is no statistical difference 
between the expected gap in the baseline testing among the two treatment groups and 
control group. The groups are on average the same. In the endline testing, however, 
students in the two treatment groups overestimated their performance by very similar 
smaller amounts 31.5 to 32.8% depending on the treatment compared to the control-group 
students (see Table 2.1 for the results in Math and English). 
 






























































Note: the table presents the average size of the gap between expected and real performance by treatment status; the 
percentage difference of the treatment group compared to the control group in curly brackets and the result of test of 
differences between treatment and control group in square brackets.  
 
The results are in line with existing literature in which feedback led to improved 
self-assessment, and to improved judgements and decision making (for example, 
Engelmann and Strobel, 2000; Duffy and Hopkins, 2005; Ryvkin et al., 2012; Moore and 
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Cain, 2007; Miller and Geraci, 2011; Hacker et al., 2008). It is important to note, however, 
that students remain overconfident, and surprisingly the size of the gap remains high over 
time (between 99.6 and 102.3% of real performance among the treated and 154.3% among 
the control group students).  
Students seem to calibrate their self-predictions more accurately in English 
compared to Math if they are provided with feedback.  The difference can be explained by 
lack of metacognitive skills as proposed by Kruger and Dunning (1999). Students in the 
control group, whose performance is a proxy for student evolution in the absence of the 
treatments, stagnated in Math over the entire academic year with their absolute 
performance actually decreasing by 0.33%. By contrast, their absolute score in English 
increased by 50.25% indicating that in this subject it may be easier for students to realize 
their mistakes and better estimate the accuracy of their responses.  
There are no significant differences in the effect sizes with respect to whether 
within- or across-class feedback is provided, suggesting that the type of feedback does not 
play a significant role. Both sets of information could be either comparably important, or 
students could neglect information about others and focus solely on the feedback regarding 
his/her own performance. The latter would be in line with “reference group neglect” by 
Camerer and Lovallo (1999).  
Does calibration of the confidence gap evolve over time? Figure 2.7 shows the 
evolution of the average treatment effect of feedback provision on the confidence gap. Each 
bar represents by how much, on average, treated students decreased their confidence gap 
compared to the control group students. The table shows the results of the t-test for 
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whether the changes between subsequent testing rounds for each treatment group 
separately are significantly different from 0. In other words, it helps to understand the 
value added of each additional exposure to testing and feedback. 
The results show that students react immediately to the provision of feedback. 
(Note that treatment 2 was implemented with a delay of one testing round due to logistical 
issues.51) The confidence gap for pooled performance shrank by 14.7% in response to the 
first provision of within-class feedback in testing round 2 and 25.8% in response to across-  
 
Figure 2.7: Changes in the gap between expected and real performance in time: overall 
performance (Math and English pooled) 
 
 
                                                 
 
51 Students were supposed to receive the first feedback approximately three weeks after our first visit. While 
we were able to evaluate all exams of the within-class feedback group, we lacked the time to evaluate more 
than 2900 students in the across-class feedback group. Since feedback to the across-class treatment group is 
based on the results of all students in that group, we failed to have the results on time.  
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class feedback first provided in testing round 3.52 The treatment effects are similar in Math 
and English (see Appendices C2.1 and C2.3).  
In order to understand the size of the treatment effect, I calculated the standardized 
differences in means between treatment and control group (or Cohen’s d; Cohen, 1988). 
Using Cohen’s (1988) classification of the effect sizes,53 one can see small treatment effects 
in the short run, and medium-to-large effects in the long run, depending on the 
intervention. Cohen’s d for aggregated treatment effects can be found in Table 2.2. 
 




















(Effect Size)  
Round 2 
Sum 0.246 0.089 NA NA 
Math 0.186 0.093 NA NA 
English 0.237 0.059 NA NA 
Round 3 
Sum 0.502 0.429 NA NA 
Math 0.513 0.439 NA NA 
English 0.416 0.345 NA NA 
Round 4 
Sum 0.562 0.594 NA NA 
Math 0.537 0.573 NA NA 
English 0.531 0.545 NA NA 
Round 5 
Sum 0.664 0.716 -0.217 -0.057 
Math 0.603 0.677 -0.168 -0.099 
English 0.619 0.627 -0.240 -0.009 
          Note: Cohen’s d classification (Cohen, 1988): small effect (0.2), medium effect (0.5), large effect (0.8)  
 
 
                                                 
 
52 The immediate effect of within-class feedback is significantly weaker compared to the effect of across-class 
feedback. The difference can be attributed either to information spread or extra exposure to tests due to the 
delay.  
53 Cohen’s d classification (Cohen, 1988): small effect (0.2), medium effect (0.5), large effect (0.8) 
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Result 5: Provision of group feedback reduces the confidence gap. 
Results 6: The accuracy of calibration significantly improves in response to the first 
two feedback provisions with no significant value added of further treatment. 
Result 7: The type of feedback does not play a role in reducing miscalibration.  
2.5.2 Skilled and Unskilled Students and their Abilities to Realize their 
Competencies  
Do skilled (or top-quartile performers) and unskilled (or bottom-quartile 
performers) students differ in their ability to improve the assessment of their own 
performance as predicted by Kruger and Dunning (1999)? Data from this experiment 
suggest the opposite: both skilled and unskilled students are able to significantly decrease 
inaccuracy in their self-assessment in a similar way. Figure 2.8 summarizes the average 
treatment effects in different testing rounds by students’ ability (bottom or top-quartile 
performers). The bars represent the decrease (in points) in the average confidence gap of 
the treated students compared to the control group students. The small table contains p-
values obtained from testing equality of the average treatment effects in two subsequent 
rounds for each treatment or control group separately. In the baseline testing there were 
no significant differences in Math between bottom and top performing students in the 
treatment versus control groups. In English, bottom (top) performing students 
miscalibrated their performance significantly more (less) compared to the control group. 
The baseline differences are taken into account in estimating the confidence gaps in rounds 
2 through 5 (see Appendix B2.1 for randomization balance).  
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Figure 2.8: Evolution of the confidence gap of bottom and top performing students  
 
Both unskilled and skilled students decrease the confidence gap similarly over time. 
In the endline testing bottom performers lowered the gap by 10.8 points, whereas top 
performers decreased it by 11.8 points (the difference is insignificant). The result goes 
against the predictions of Kruger and Dunning (1999) who predicted that “because of their 
difficulty recognizing competence in others, incompetent individuals will be unable to use 
information about their choices and performances of others to form more accurate 
impressions of their own ability” (p.1122). The type of feedback does not play a significant 
role.  
While the top performing students react immediately to both types of treatment, 
bottom performers react with a one-round delay to within-class feedback provision. In all 
other terms the miscalibrations of bottom and top performing students are similar. Both 
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groups reach the maximum in terms of the level of the confidence gap calibration in testing 
round 4.  
 
Result 8: Both the unskilled and the skilled students are able to improve in terms of 
self-assessment if they receive feedback.  
One may argue that the improvement may be driven by the students who improved 
their performance and who learned about their abilities over time.54 I repeated the exercise 
separately for students who improved during the academic year and those who did not and 
found similar patterns in both cases (for the detailed results see Appendix C2.4). Greater 
improvements can be observed among students who improved their performance (see 
Appendix A2.2).   
Result 9: Even students who do not improve their performance during an academic 
year reduce their inaccuracy in estimating their own performance if they receive repeated 
feedback.  
Overall, I find rather mixed evidence for the predictions of Kruger and Dunning 
(1999). While the unskilled students strongly overestimated their performance, the skilled 
students did not underestimate their performance. Students from both ends of the 
performance distribution were able to reduce the gap between the expected and the real 
score.  
                                                 
 
54 Note that Kruger and Dunning (1999) did not predict such a possibility for the unskilled students. They predicted 
improvements in calibrations only to competent students who gain insight into their metacognitive abilities. The 
analysis is based on an assumption that improvements in metacognitive skills come hand in hand with the 
improvements in student performance. This may be a strong assumption, however, but due to the absence of 
different measures of metacognitive skills, this was the only way to provide more insight. 
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2.6 Heterogeneity  
2.6.1 Is the Effect Dependent on the Task Difficulty? 
Burson et al. (2006) attributed the existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect to the 
perceived difficulty of the task. While in easy and moderate tasks bottom performers 
overestimated their performance, top performers were highly inaccurate in difficult tasks. 
The authors found that people from both ends of the ability distribution were prone to 
similar degrees of miscalibration while they varied the level of the difficulty of tasks used in 
their sessions. In my case, I asked students during the baseline testing to evaluate how 
difficult they found the exam in Math and in English relative to the exams they typically 
experience. Since the measure of the task difficulty differs from that used in Burson et al.  
(2006), the effect sizes cannot be directly compared. However, it is sufficient to relate the 
existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect and the students’ perception of the difficulty.  
Based on the baseline testing data, the students who perceive exams as easier 
(relative to common tasks) come from significantly stronger backgrounds compared to the 
students who perceive them as more difficult.55 As shown in Figure 2.9, on tasks perceived 
as easier all students overestimated their performance with the top performers being more 
accurate compared to the bottom performers (see also Appendix C2.8). The pattern is 
similar in both baseline and endline testing rounds in both Math and English. If the 
students perceived the task as more difficult, the unskilled students overestimated their 
performance and the skilled students under-estimated their performance with the 
                                                 
 
55 In Math (English), the average score of the students who perceived the task as rather difficult was 8.945 (8.145) 
points, while the average score of students who perceived it as easy was 12.687 (12.704).  
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difference between over and under-estimation insignificant (p-value=0.178 in Math and p-
value=0.175 in English).  
 
Result 10: There is supportive evidence for the existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect - even if 
the students receive repeated feedback - if the students perceive the task to be difficult. If the 
students perceive the task to be easy, students are predominantly overconfident.  
 
Figure 2.9: The differences in the calibration of the confidence gap between bottom- and top-
performers and by their perception of task difficulty 
 
 
Burson et al. (2006) attribute students’ inaccuracy in predictions to the lack of 
understanding of how well their peers do in a given task. It is therefore expected that if 
students are informed about the performance of others, the level of inaccuracy should 
decrease, the unskilled should become less over-confident and the skilled more over-
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confident. Looking at the endline predictions of students in this study, I can see that the 
pattern persists even if students were exposed to repeated feedback. The most plausible 
explanation is that students only extracted information about themselves from the 
feedback they received and neglected information about others. Such results would be in 
line with “reference group neglect” introduced by Camerer and Lovallo (1999).  
2.6.2 Gender Differences  
Boys do not improve their performance in response to pure feedback provision 
while girls do (see the results in Chapter 1 of this dissertation). A possible explanation 
could be that boys ignore the information. In such case they would not improve accuracy in 
their estimations of the own performance either. In the baseline testing, the confidence gap 
between girls and boys is insignificant. The results show that both girls and boys use 
information to lower the confidence gap, for girls by 37.5%, and for boys by 24.5% in the 
final testing round.  Boys update significantly less in all testing rounds except the second 
round when the gender difference is insignificant. The type of treatment does not play a 
significant role – neither for girls nor for boys - suggesting that they either put equal weight 
on within-class and across-class feedback or they extract information only about their own 
performance. The evolution of the confidence gap calibration in response to treatments is 
shown in Figure 2.10 and Appendices C2.7 and C2.10.  
Result 11: Girls decrease their inaccuracy in assessment of their performance 





Figure 2.10: The evolution of the confidence gap calibration – by gender and testing round  
 
Note: p-values report the results of testing the gender differences in calibrations of confidence gap in response to 
different feedback provision.  
 
2.6.3 Student Confidence in Competition for Monetary and Non-Monetary 
Rewards  
What happens to the student confidence level if they are included in a competition 
for rewards56? Overall, one control and eight treatment groups were formed – four pure 
treatment groups (two feedback and two reward groups) and four groups with treatment 
interactions (two types of feedback combined with two types of rewards). Such design 
allows me to disentangle what happens to student confidence once they are included in 
group competition with or without perfect information about their own performance, 
performance of group members and that of competitors.  
                                                 
 
56 Note that the rewards were introduced right before the last testing round; therefore, the immediate effects 
can be studies only for the feedback treatment groups. 
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The design of the experiment therefore offers a comparison of two different 
competitive environments. The first is based on intergroup comparison and repeated 
provision of feedback about group performance. It represents competition for students 
who are intrinsically competitive and seek comparison to others without being 
incentivized. The second competitive environment is based on a tournament in which 
students have a chance to win monetary or non-monetary rewards. 
Students who receive either pure feedback or feedback together with monetary or 
non-monetary rewards overestimated their performance significantly less, i.e., by only 22 
to 32%. On the contrary, students who received no feedback but participated in a 
competition increased the confidence gap by 6-8% more. The result is driven purely by an 
increase in girls’ overconfidence (11%), whereas the boys’ confidence gap remains 
unchanged. In other words, in the scenario with no feedback, boys are similarly inaccurate 
about their expectations of their performance, whether they are included in a tournament 
for rewards or not, but girls’ expectations increase significantly with the introduction of 
rewards. Girls’ self-assessment inaccuracy increases while their performance remains the 
same whereas boys’ expectations remain similarly inaccurate (compared to the control 
group boys) and their performance significantly improves. Girls therefore may remain 
behind boys in terms of improvements in tournaments for rewards due to inflated 
expectations about their performance. The current experiment, however, does not offer 
further details and it would be interesting to see possible explanations in future studies. 
Information provision is the driving force of students’ perception calibration (for details 




Result 12: The inclusion of students in a group competition for rewards (without any 
feedback regarding their performance) may increase their inaccuracy of assessment of one’s 
own performance, at least in the case of females.  
2.6.4 Differences by Age  
One may argue that the reaction to feedback may differ by students’ age, either 
because of more years of education, improvement in the topic or simply because they 
become more “mature.” I interacted the age of students with treatment dummies. The 
results suggest that age does not play a significant role in calibration improvements. The 
reason could be that unlike developed countries in which the age range within a class is 
around 1 year, the average age range in Ugandan primary and secondary schools is 7 years 
(i.e., students’ age in the 6th grade of primary school range from the official age of 12/13 up 
to 19).   
Students are very often absent, with the absence rate varying between 19.2 and 
29.3% during our visits, and they are often asked to repeat the classes. Only 51.1% of 
students indicated that they had not repeated any class before the time they were 
interviewed. The results presented in Appendix C2.6 compare the calibration by self-
assessment of students at the official age in their respective classes (i.e., 12-13 years old in 
the 6th grade in primary school) to students who are older than the official age. The results 
suggest that students at the official age calibrate their expectations regarding their own-
performance similarly compared to the students who are older than the official age. While 
the reasons some students delayed their school attendance do not seem to matter in 
calibrations of their self-assessments, the level of study (primary or secondary school) does 
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seem to play a significant role in the magnitude of calibration improvement (the pattern is 
similar). Students in secondary schools decrease the perception gap to a greater degree 
compared to primary school students. The difference can be attributed to higher selection 
criteria in secondary schools. The results are presented in Appendix C2.5. 
2.7 Summary 
People are often overconfident about their outcomes. The participants in this 
experiment - primary and secondary school students in Southern Uganda – are not an 
exception. Overconfidence may be costly and therefore researchers have searched for ways 
to improve people’s self-assessment of their own performance. Feedback typically helps to 
increase the accuracy of the assessment and lower the gap between perceived and real 
performance. People, however, remain overconfident.  
This paper contributes to the current literature in the following ways. First, the 
results shed light on what happens to students’ overconfidence if students are evaluated in 
groups, and they repeatedly receive feedback about their own performance and the 
performance of their groups. The type of feedback does not play a significant role in 
students’ accuracy of calibration of their self-assessment. A possible explanation is that 
students neglect information about others (as suggested by Camerer and Lovallo, 1999) 
even in the scenarios where they are evaluated in groups and their group score therefore 
depends directly on the score of other group members. The provision of feedback helps 
students to lower inflated self-assessments of their own performance; however, the 
overconfidence persists.  
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Students seem to significantly improve their calibrations in response to the first two 
feedback provisions, followed by insignificant improvements in the confidence gap with 
any extra treatment. Girls decrease their inaccuracy in self-assessment significantly more 
compared to boys. In a competitive environment, when students were randomly selected to 
compete for monetary or non-monetary rewards but received no feedback previously 
about their performance, girls became significantly more overconfident, whereas boys 
were not affected. 
Furthermore the results of this experiment bring evidence from primary and 
secondary schools in Uganda to the debate regarding the existence of the unskilled-and-
unaware phenomenon (also known as the Dunning-Kruger effect first documented by 
Kruger and Dunning, 1999). Unskilled students grossly overestimate their performance 
and skilled students underestimate their performance if they perceive the task to be easier 
compared to the tasks used at schools. If the students of this experiment perceived the task 
to be more difficult, both bottom and top performers were overconfident. If they perceived 
the task to be easier or of comparable difficulty, students were predominantly 
overconfident (the unskilled significantly more compared to the skilled students). The 
results are in line with Burson et al. (2006) who first documented the conditionality of the 
existence of the Dunning-Kruger effect on task difficulty.  The results also show that the 
unskilled students improve in their accuracy even if they do not improve their 
performance. Such a result is against the prediction of Kruger and Dunning (1999) who 
expected no ability of the unskilled students to improve in response to feedback provision. 





Appendix A2: Description of data 








Overall AM (AE),  in % 81.0 / 85.3 11.2 / 8.9 7.8 / 5.8 
Girls AM (AE),  in % 81.1 / 85.6 11.4 / 8.8 7.5 / 5.6 
Boys AM (AE),  in % 80.9 / 85.0 10.9 / 8.9 8.2 / 6.1 
Math: performance (points) 11.56 12.45 15.65 
English: performance (points) 11.39 12.82 18.46 
Math: estimation gap (in points) 14.89 0.21 -6.49 
English: estimation gap (in points) 15.14 0.48 -6.56 
Absenteeism (in %) 28.7 32.7 28.2 
Stress (in %) 7.0 7.2 7.2 
Subjective happiness (level) 10.7 11.6 11.3 
Effort (in Math, level) 3.7 3.4 3.2 
Effort (in English, level) 3.6 3.3 3.3 
 
Note: first three rows describe the percentage represented by over/well/underestimated self-assessment (for the overall 
sample, girls or boys only); “estimation gap” stands for the difference between anticipated number of points and the 
corresponding real score, “absenteeism” accounts for percentage of students absent during the last visit given their 
presence in the baseline testing, “stress” level is measured by the Stressed Perceived Scale (a 0-4 Likert scale), “subjective 
happiness” by the Subjective Happiness Scale (a 7-point Likert scale); “effort” is a subjective measure of the level of effort 








Appendix A2.3: Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test of equality of matched pairs of 
observations, by round and by subject 
Difference between expected 

















Note: the null hypothesis is that the observations come from the same distribution. 
 
 
Appendix A2.4: Comparison of baseline distribution of Math and English score, by confidence level 
 
Note: A student is considered to be underconfident if his/her real performance was higher than the upper limit of the 
interval he/she predicted his/her real score would belong to, well-calibrated if the real score was within the predicted 
interval, and overconfident if the real score was below the lower limit of the interval he/she predicted for his/her real 
score. In both Math and English underconfident students performed better than overconfident students and students with 










Appendix A2.5: Comparison of the distribution of the confidence gap in the final testing round, by 
subject and treatment status 
 
 
Note: T1 stands for within-class feedback, T2 for across-class feedback and Control for control group without any 
feedback. A student is considered to be underconfident if his/her real performance was higher than the upper limit of the 
interval he/she predicted his/her real score would belong to, well-calibrated if the real score was within the predicted 
interval, and overconfident if the real score was below the lower limit of the interval he/she predicted for his/her real 
score. The confidence gap of the control group students is significantly higher compared to the treated students.  
 
 
Appendix A2.6: Perceived versus actual performance – division into bottom/top quartile based on 
the performance in Round 2  
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Appendix A2.8: The evolution of the performance and the confidence gap of bottom and top quartile 
students who stayed in or switched from the initial performance quartile – by treatment status 
 
Note: SC1 stands for scenario 1 in which only non-switchers are taken into account (i.e., bottom (top) performers who 
scored in the bottom/top quartile in all testing rounds). SC2 stands for scenario 2 in which only switchers are taken into 
account (students who performed in the bottom (top) quartile in the baseline survey but performed in a better (worse) 













Appendix B2: Randomization balance and baseline testing 
Appendix B2.1: Comparison of mean characteristics of students in treatment and control groups, 
















Within-class feedback (T1) 





Within-class feedback (T1) 















































Note: Mean comparisons. P-values from testing joint differences between treated and control groups are in square 
brackets. Bottom-/Top-performers are students whose performances fall in the bottom/top performance quartile in 
every testing round. 
 
 
Appendix B2.2: Relation between initial performance and initial confidence gap 
Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are presented in brackets. Controlled for stratum 
fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations).  * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 







Initial confidence gap 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Initial overall performance  
     (Math and English pooled)  
Within-class feedback 
 
Across-class feedback  
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Number of observations 
 









































Appendix C2: Average Treatment Effects 




Note: OLS. Error bars show robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level. Controlled for stratum fixed 
effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). The table shows test results from testing 
significance in gaps in two subsequent rounds (i.e., it tests how significant the improvements in calibrations are in the two 





Appendix C2.2: OLS estimates of the effects of different motivation schemes on the student 
confidence gap – short-term versus long-term effects  
 




Short-term effects Long-term effects Long-term effects 
Math English Math English Math English 
PANEL A: AGGREGATED TREATMENT EFFECTS 
Within-class feedback (T1) 
 
Across-class feedback (T2) 
 
Financial Rewards (Finrew) 
 
Reputational Rewards (Reprew) 
 
Baseline Score Anticipation  
 
Controlled for stratas  
Prob > F 
Number of observations 
   -2.475*** 
(0.682) 











   -2.278*** 
(0.593) 











    -7.573*** 
(0.659) 

























  (0.639) 
 -7.875*** 
  (0.663) 
   1.361 
  (0.864) 
   1.223 
  (0.835) 
   0.243*** 




    -6.413*** 
(0.621) 
    -6.625*** 
(0.634) 
      1.336 
(0.913) 
     -0.148 
(0.815)  





PANEL B: INTERACTION OF ALL TREATMENTS 
PURE TREATMENTS 
Within-class social comparison  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class social comparison  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards    
     (Rep_solo) 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback with  
     financial reward (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback with  
     financial reward (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback with  
     reputational reward (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback with   
     reputational reward (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline Score Anticipation 
  
Controlled for stratas  
Prob > F 
Number of observations 
     
 -7.261*** 
  (0.938) 
 -7.694*** 
  (0.935) 
  1.262 
  (1.149) 
  2.052* 

















   -5.748*** 
(0.936) 
   -6.310*** 
(0.945) 
      1.580 
(1.024) 
      0.889 
(1.133) 
 
    -5.336*** 
(1.483) 
    -4.031*** 
(1.027) 
    -6.277*** 
(1.083) 
    -7.000*** 
(1.235) 
 





Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed 
effects (area, school performance at national examination and grade level). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%   
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Appendix C2.3: Average treatment effects of different incentive schemes on the confidence gap, by 
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   6.989*** 
(1.706) 
[p=0.000] 










Differences (Bottom/Top:  
     Within versus Across  
      FB) 
 










   -8.024*** 
(1.222) 
 







   11.859*** 
(2.002) 
[p=0.000] 














   -8.748*** 
(1.016) 
 







   6.124*** 
(1.700) 
[p=0.000] 
   6.666*** 
(1.462) 
[p=0.000] 







Differences (Bottom/Top:  
     Within versus Across  






















   11.600*** 
(2.033) 
[p=0.000] 
























   8.577*** 
(1.463) 
[p=0.000] 
   11.485*** 
(1.299) 
(p=0.000] 
Note: OLS. Bottom-/Top-performers are students whose performances fall in the bottom/top performance quartile in all 
five testing rounds. The table provides comparison in Round 1 (baseline testing), Round 2 (short-term effects), and Round 
5 (endline testing, long-term effects). Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. 
Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). Columns 4 and 7 
describe difference between bottom versus top performers and test results for the difference in square brackets. 
Differences within bottom/top performers by the type of feedback are presented in the last row in each section. * 






Appendix C2.4: Comparison of the calibration patterns of the students who did or did not improve 
their performance over time  
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   -4.691*** 
(1.541) 
 








































Note: Note: OLS. Bottom-/Top-performers are students whose performances fall in the bottom/top performance quartile 
in all five testing rounds. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for 
stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). Column 4 and 7 describe difference 
between bottom versus top performers and test results for the difference in square brackets. Differences within 
bottom/top performers by the type of feedback are presented in the last row in each section. Panel A and B differ in 
selection of students into the bottom/top quartile. While bottom/top performing students in the Panel A improved their 
performance between baseline and endline testing, students in Panel B did not improve their performance. * significant at 








Appendix C2.5: OLS estimates of the effects of different motivation schemes on student confidence 
gap – by level of study  
 
 




Study level:  
Confidence gap 
Math English 
Primary Secondary difference Primary Secondary difference 
PURE TREATMENTS 
Within-class comparison  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class comparison  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards  
     (Rep_solo) 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback with   
     reputational rewards (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback with  
     reputational rewards (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline perception  
  
Baseline Score  
 
 
Controlled for stratas  
Prob > F 






  1.740 



























   (2.444) 
 -2.739 




































































   -1.745 






































Note: OLS. Primary stands for primary school (level P6 and P7) and secondary for secondary schools (levels S1 up to S4). 
Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, 
level and school performance in national examinations). Column 4 and 7 describe difference between bottom versus top 
performers and test results for the difference in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 







Appendix C2.6: OLS estimates of the effects of different motivation schemes on student confidence 
gap – students at official age versus older  
 
 







Official Unofficial difference Official Unofficial difference 
PURE TREATMENTS 
Within-class comparison  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class comparison  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards  
     (Rep_solo) 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback with   
     reputational rewards (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback with  
     reputational rewards (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline perception  
  
Baseline Score  
 
 
Controlled for stratas 
Prob > F  






  0.625 
  (1.404) 
  1.547 
  (1.171) 
 
 -6.686*** 
  (1.393) 
 -7.539***  
  (1.259) 
 -7.059*** 




   0.237***  
  (0.024) 
 -0.421***  





















  -5.212** 
(2.136) 
 

































   2.234 
(1.474) 





















  -6.379*** 
(1.244) 











  -5.649*** 
(1.460) 
  -6.715*** 
(1.613) 
 
   0.269*** 
(0.029) 























Note: OLS. Official stands for official age of student in his/her class (i.e., all students who started primary at the age of 6 
and did not repeat any class). Unofficial stands unofficial age and contain students older than official age. Robust standard 
errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school 
performance in national examinations). Column 4 and 7 describe difference between bottom versus top performers and 
test results for the difference in square brackets.  







Appendix C2.7: OLS estimates of the effects of different motivation schemes on student confidence 
gap – by gender 
 
 

















Within-class comparison  
     (T1_solo) 
Across-class comparison  
     (T2_solo) 
Financial Rewards  
     (Fin_solo) 
Reputational Rewards  
     (Rep_solo) 
TREATMENT INTERACTIONS 
Within-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T1_fin) 
Across-class feedback with  
     financial rewards (T2_fin) 
Within-class feedback with   
     reputational rewards (T1_rep) 
Across-class feedback with  
     reputational rewards (T2_rep) 
 
Baseline perception  
  
Baseline Score  
 
 
Controlled for stratas  
Prob > F 





































  1.033 
 (1.791) 
 
  -4.727*** 
  (1.731) 
  -3.893* 
  (2.065) 
  -6.133*** 
  (1.522) 
  -7.158***  
   (1.616) 
 
   0.229*** 
  (0.031) 
  -0.395*** 

























  -6.733*** 
   (1.162) 
 -7.476*** 
   (1.083) 
   2.463* 
   (1.301) 
   1.611 
  (1.142) 
 
 -5.909*** 
  (1.354) 
 -5.482*** 
  (1.154) 
 -7.108*** 
  (1.201) 
 -7.047*** 
  (1.423) 
 
   0.293*** 
  (0.027) 
-0.348*** 







  -5.353*** 
(1.133) 







  -4.194** 
(1.765) 
  -4.053** 
(2.012) 
  -6.342*** 
(1.536) 
  -7.297*** 
(1.734) 
 


























Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed 
effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). Column 4 and 7 describe difference between 
bottom versus top performers and test results for the difference in square brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 







Appendix C2.8: Level differences in average perception gap, by student performance, treatment 





















PANEL A: BASELINE TESTING (ROUND 1) 
Bottom: Within-class feedback  
     group (T1_bottom) 
Top: Within-class feedback  
     group (T1_top) 
Bottom: Across-class feedback  
     group (T2_bottom) 
Top: Across-class feedback  
     group (T2_top) 
Bottom: Control group 
 
Top: Control group 
 
Joint test (bottom-performers) 
Joint test (top-performers) 



















































































PANEL B: ENDLINE TESTING (ROUND 5) 
Bottom: Within-class feedback  
     group (T1_bottom) 
Top: Within-class feedback  
     group (T1_top) 
Bottom: Across-class feedback  
     group (T2_bottom) 
Top: Across-class feedback  
     group (T2_top) 
Bottom: Control group 
 
Top: Control group 
 
Joint test (bottom vs. control) 
Joint test (top vs. control) 
Joint test (bottom vs. top) 
  7.799 
 
          -3.143 
 
  7.299 
 












































































Note: Mean comparisons. Controlled for stratum fixed effects (area, level and school performance in national 
examinations). Column 4 and 7 show p-values from testing the differences by subject perception. Joint tests in bottom 





































Note: OLS. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at class level are in parentheses. Controlled for stratum fixed 
effects (area, level and school performance in national examinations). Improvement equals 1 if students improved 




















Across-class feedback  
 
Within-class feedback x  
     improvement  
Across-class feedback x   
     improvement  
Within-class feedback x  
     official age 
Across-class feedback x  
     official age 
Within-class feedback x level  
     of study 
Across-class feedback x level  











Prob > F 




































































  -0.476 
































   -2.09 
   (2.252) 
















Appendix C2.10: The differences in the calibration of the confidence gap between girls and boys in 
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